Weaponizing Tear Gas:  Bahrain’s Unprecedented Use of Toxic Chemical Agents Against Civilians. by Sollom, Richard & Atkinson, Holly G.
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research City College of New York
Summer 8-1-2012
Weaponizing Tear Gas: Bahrain’s Unprecedented
Use of Toxic Chemical Agents Against Civilians.
Richard Sollom
Physicians for Human Rights
Holly G. Atkinson
CUNY City College
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_pubs
Part of the Chemical and Pharmacologic Phenomena Commons, Human Rights Law Commons,
International Law Commons, International Public Health Commons, Medical Toxicology
Commons, Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, Other Public Health Commons, and the
Toxicology Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the City College of New York at CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact
AcademicWorks@cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sollom R and Atkinson HG. (2012, August 1). Weaponizing Tear Gas: Bahrain’s unprecedented use of toxic chemical agents against
civilians. Physicians for Human Rights, Cambridge, MA.
Weaponizing Tear Gas:
Bahrain’s Unprecedented Use of  
Toxic Chemical Agents Against Civilians
Physicians for Human Rights
physiciansforhumanrights.org
August 2012
About Physicians for Human Rights
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) uses medicine and science to investigate and expose 
human rights violations. We work to prevent rights abuses by seeking justice and holding 
offenders accountable. 
Since 1986, PHR has conducted investigations in more than 40 countries, including on:
1987 —  Use of toxic chemical agents in South Korea 
1988 —  Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Kurds 
1988 —  Use of toxic chemical agents in West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
1989 —  Use of chemical warfare agents in Soviet Georgia 
1996 —  Exhumation of mass graves in the Balkans 
1996 —  Critical forensic evidence of genocide in Rwanda 
1999 —  Drafting the UN-endorsed guidelines for documentation of torture 
2004 —  Documentation of the genocide in Darfur 
2008 —  US complicity of torture in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo Bay 
2010 —  Human experimentation by CIA medical personnel on prisoners in violation of the  
 Nuremberg Code  
2011 —  Violations of medical neutrality in times of armed conflict and civil unrest during  
 the Arab Spring
2 Arrow Street | Suite 301 1156 15th Street, NW | Suite 1001
Cambridge, MA 02138 USA Washington, DC 20005 USA
+1 617 301 4200 +1 202 728 5335
physiciansforhumanrights.org
...
©2012, Physicians for Human Rights.  All rights reserved.
ISBN: 1-879707-68-3 
Library of Congress Control Number: 2012945532
Cover photo: Bahraini anti-riot police fire tear gas grenades at peaceful and unarmed civilians protesters, including a 
Shi’a cleric, in June 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxauI5hdjqk.
Opposite:  Bahraini boy displays one of several exploded tear gas canisters fired into his family’s house.  
Photo: Richard Sollom, PHR.
“[T]he evidence already assembled 
regarding the pattern of use of tear 
gas, as well as its toxicology, raises 
the question of whether its further 
use can be condoned under any cir-
cumstances… [T]here is an important 
role for the independent [health] pro-
fessional: to study, document, ana-
lyze, and report on such hazards and 
to advise government on what does 
and does not carry an acceptable risk. 
If a weapon is found to present too 
serious a risk, it is then the respon-
sibility of those in charge of public 
safety to decide on alternatives.” 
Dr. Howard Hu and other medical investigators from Physicians for Human Rights, 
in “Tear Gas—Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?” 
The Journal of American Medical Association 
(4 Aug. 1989) Vol. 262, No. 5.
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1executive summary
The tiny Persian Gulf Kingdom of Bahrain still smolders amid ongoing civil unrest 18 months 
after protesters began calling for political reform. Governments in the region have resorted 
to lethal force or have precipitated outright civil war in response to the outcries for political 
reform and human rights in the context of the “Arab awakening.” Bahrain’s Sunni monarchy 
notably has silenced dissent and punished the opposition by rounding up doctors and peaceful 
protesters, torturing many of them, filing trumped-up charges, and imposing harsh prison sen-
tences. The vicious crackdown in Bahrain has received global attention and warranted a special 
international commission of inquiry into Bahrain’s excessive use of force and human rights vio-
lations. Throughout this time, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has played a leading role in 
defense of our medical colleagues whose rights have been severely violated in Bahrain. 
Less visible is the unusually relentless and indiscriminate campaign that Bahraini authorities 
have waged against the majority Shi’a population for more than 500 days by weaponizing toxic 
chemical agents—so called tear gas.  In Bahrain, law enforcement officials have deployed this 
toxic agent to punish protesters, inflict suffering, and suppress dissent. Usually perceived by 
the public and security forces as a benign tool for crowd control, tear gas, especially when 
used in large quantities and in enclosed spaces, poses serious health risks and even causes 
death. Since February 2011, the Bahraini government has unleashed a torrent of these toxic 
chemical agents against men, women, and children, including the elderly and infirm.
Twenty-five years ago, PHR documented the deleterious and long-term health effects of tear 
gas used indiscriminately in South Korea against civilian protesters, including toxic pulmo-
nary damage and death, as well as possible miscarriages. As physicians we were then com-
pelled to question whether the further use of these toxic chemical agents could be condoned 
under any circumstances. 
The extensive and persistent use of this so-called nonlethal chemical agent now in Bahrain—
unprecedented in the 100-year history of tear gas use against civilians throughout the world—
compels PHR once again to call the world’s attention to the known and still unknown serious 
health consequences of tear gas, including death. As human rights advocates and health pro-
fessionals, we are ethically obligated to highlight the toxic and lethal effects of tear gas and its 
indiscriminate and illegal use in Bahrain. 
Methods
This report’s findings are based on field research that PHR conducted in Bahrain (7-12 April 
2012) to investigate excessive use of force by law enforcement officials since June 2011—the 
end of Bahrain’s state of emergency. The medico-legal team (Richard Sollom, MA, MPH and 
Holly Atkinson, MD) conducted 102 in-depth interviews with Bahrainis who reported human 
rights violations, corroborating eyewitnesses to these alleged events, civil society leaders, 
and government officials. Other forms of corroboration that PHR conducted or utilized in this 
study include: Physical examinations, evaluation of medical records, and review of radio-
graphic, photographic, and video evidence. In addition, this report contains results from an 
analysis of 28 countries whose security forces have deployed toxic chemical agents against 
civilians in situations of civil unrest. 
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2 Findings
This report documents two interconnected means by which the Bahraini government unlaw-
fully uses toxic chemical agents against civilians: (1) Government authorities have routinely 
violated every U.N. principle governing police use of force. (2) Bahraini law enforcement of-
ficials have also effectively transformed toxic chemical agents into weapons used to assail 
Shi’a civilians inside their homes and cars. 
Bahraini government violates UN principles on the use of force  
during protests 
While current international law allows governments to use some chemical agents for crowd 
control purposes, Bahraini law enforcement officials routinely violate every U.N. principle of 
their use. Specifically, PHR documents in this report that Bahraini authorities:
(1) Fail to exercise restraint before resorting to force; 
(2) Use disproportionate force when responding to protesters; and 
(3) Fail to minimize damage and injury to demonstrators. 
Such unrestrained use of toxic chemical agents against civilians has caused superfluous—and 
sometimes life-threatening—harm to men, women, and children in Bahrain. Injured protest-
ers whom PHR investigators examined suffered from blunt force trauma and lacerations to 
the head, torso, and limbs due to the impact of metal canisters being fired at them by law en-
forcement officials at close range. 
Police hit one bystander in the head with a tear gas canister while he was walking near the 
site of a protest in Karanah, causing a fractured skull and intracranial hemorrhaging. “You’re 
lucky to have survived,” the doctor who performed the CT scan told this victim, “Others from 
the same injury have died.”  
Bahraini government violates human rights law by weaponizing  
toxic chemical agents
Equally unprecedented is the Government of Bahrain’s transformation of toxic chemical 
agents into weapons used methodically to attack Shi’a civilians inside their homes and cars. 
Such unprovoked and flagrant assaults on families—who pose no threat to the safety of 
others—flout international human rights law and constitute torture, cruel, and inhuman treat-
ment. Specifically, the report documents that Bahraini law enforcement officials:
(1) Subject men, women, children, vulnerable, disabled and elderly persons to torture, 
cruel, and inhuman treatment; 
(2) Unlawfully enter families’ homes and destroy property; 
(3) Intentionally commit acts that impair people’s health; and 
(4) Discriminate against one religious sect by targeting Shi’a neighborhoods. 
The weaponized toxic chemical agent attacks against Bahraini civilians are intentional—and 
may be official policy—because of the frequency of the attacks by officials throughout the po-
lice force and the lack of accountability for those who perpetrate the attacks. 
Two sisters from Shela told PHR investigators that police shot tear gas canisters directly into 
their home on five separate occasions. On the second occasion, they reported police ripped 
protective covers off of the family’s air conditioners and pulled sealant away from the win-
dows from the outside, before throwing tear gas canisters through a window and yelling, 
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3“If you want freedom, come out to us.” They reported that in the third incident, police broke 
through the front door and threw a tear gas canister into their home. 
PHR investigators also interviewed several members of a large family—ages 3 to 65—who were 
forced from their home after police stormed it, attempted to abduct a 15-year-old boy, and fired 
canisters containing toxic chemical agents into the house causing a 14-year-old girl to fall un-
conscious. Law enforcement officials then reportedly surrounded the exits, inhibiting escape. 
Such attacks appear to discriminate against Bahrain’s Shi’a majority population. Preliminary 
analysis of data suggests that the majority of Shi’a neighborhoods (comprising 80% of all 
neighborhoods in Bahrain) have been exposed to toxic chemical agent attacks at least once 
per week since February 2011. Sunni-dominated neighborhoods have largely remained free 
from toxic chemical agent attacks. 
Bahrain’s misuse of toxic chemical agents endangers the health of civilians and 
causes severe and long-term pain and suffering
Physicians for Human Rights warns that the ongoing 18-month siege and widespread use of 
toxic chemical agents against a civilian population has caused inestimable physical harm and 
will continue to inflict as yet unknown negative health effects among this population. Bahraini 
law enforcement officials’ persistent targeting civilians in enclosed spaces may lead to seri-
ous long-term health consequences, including miscarriages and severe respiratory distress 
resulting in premature death. 
PHR spoke with two families who had family members who allegedly died from complications 
related to toxic chemical agent exposure. In both cases, deceased individuals were only ex-
posed to toxic chemical agents in the privacy of their homes, and died despite treatment in the 
hospital. PHR met with relatives of Muhammad, a young asthmatic man from a Shi’a village, 
who died of acute respiratory failure following 25 days of hospitalization after exposure to 
toxic chemical agents. Muhammad’s family reported that he was routinely exposed to tear gas 
and sought medical care in private hospitals, but never told doctors about his severe adverse 
reactions to the gas for fear of being reported to authorities and sent to prison.
policy recommendations 
Countries like Bahrain that have so profoundly abused tear gas as a means to preemptively 
assault civilians should lose access to these toxic chemical agents. All other countries that 
have deployed these chemicals as per U.N. principles and with due respect for human life and 
dignity should reevaluate their use given the dangerous health consequences wrought by tear 
gas and should utilize these agents with extreme caution.
To the Government of Bahrain:
• End all attacks on civilians, including tear gas attacks on civilians and homes.
• Given the harmful effects of tear gas misuse in the country, suspend all use of tear gas 
until such time as the Government of Bahrain conducts a full and impartial investigation 
of the events detailed in this report, retrains the national security forces in the proper use 
of tear gas, and holds the perpetrators of excessive or improper use of force accountable. 
After such initial benchmarks are met, adhere to United Nations guidelines on the use of 
force and to the Bahraini penal code in order to stem future misuse of tear gas.
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4 • Establish an independent body consisting of individuals familiar with human rights and 
legal norms regarding the use of force to investigate the deliberate misuse of toxic 
chemical agents in Bahrain. 
• Disclose information about the varieties of toxic chemical agents used by law 
enforcement officials in Bahrain, given the disturbing evidence of the harmful effects 
of toxic chemical agents from PHR’s investigation as well as the BICI Report. This 
information will be important to the current treatment of exposed Bahraini citizens, and 
to drive future scientific research on the effects of all toxic chemical agents.  
• Allow scientists, health professionals, and epidemiologists to conduct critical 
toxicological and survey research on the use and effects of tear gas in Bahrain.
To the international community:
• Suspend global exports of tear gas and its relevant precursor chemical agents to 
Bahrain until such time as the Government of Bahrain conducts a full and impartial 
investigation of the events detailed in this report, retrains the national security forces in 
the proper use of tear gas, and holds the perpetrators of excessive or improper use of 
force accountable. 
• Convene an interdisciplinary group of health professionals, lawyers, law enforcement 
officials, and public health experts to draft guiding principles on the proper use of 
all toxic chemical agents, especially those classified as lachrymatory agents, and 
to determine whether the application and toxicity of certain lachrymatory agents 
necessitate re-classification under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
• Support scientific research into the health effects of tear gas, including research on 
the possible connection to miscarriage and/or genetic disorders as well as long-term 
respiratory sequelae of excessive exposure.
• Review international, regional, national, and local guidelines on tear gas use and ensure 
that they follow the parameters of the UN Guidelines on the Use of Force, including 
mechanisms for accountability for misuse.
To the United States:
• Continue to deny export licenses for tear gas to Bahrain until the Government of Bahrain 
adheres to UN Guidelines on the Use of Force regarding its tear gas use, investigates the 
weaponization of tear gas, and establishes accountability for law enforcement officials 
who use excessive force or otherwise violate the UN Guidelines.
• Revoke tear gas licenses for other countries that show warning signs of improper use of 
tear gas or other riot control items against peaceful civilians.
• As a matter of policy, ensure that all tear gas and related materials are listed on the 
State Department’s US Munitions List, given the fatal consequences of the improper use 
of tear gas. 
• Provide stricter end-use monitoring of tear gas and related materials through the 
Department of Defense.
• Ensure that any military assistance to Bahrain comports with the Leahy Law and section 
502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
• Fully support international efforts to draft guiding principles on the proper use of all 
toxic chemical agents, and lead the international community in supporting scientific 
research on the health effects of these agents. 
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5Methods and Limitations
This report’s findings are based on field research that Physicians for Human Rights con-
ducted in Bahrain (7-12 April 2012) to investigate reported violations of medical neutrality 
and excessive use of force by law enforcement officials1 in Bahrain during the previous year. 
Extensive desk research (using Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest, and PubMed databases) supplemented 
this analysis. The PHR team was comprised of Richard Sollom, Deputy Director at PHR, and 
Holly Atkinson, Assistant Professor of Medicine and Director of the Human Rights Program 
at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, and Assistant Professor of Public Health at Weill Medical 
College of Cornell University.
The team conducted 102 semi-structured interviews with Bahrainis who reported human 
rights violations, corroborating eyewitnesses to these alleged events, civil society leaders, 
and government officials. To select these information-rich cases, field researchers conducted 
purposeful sampling to garner both cases that highlighted individual human rights violations 
(intensity sampling) as well as cases that described cross-cutting themes (heterogeneity 
sampling). Chain (or snowball) sampling was employed to locate corroborating witnesses, 
who were interviewed independently from the original source, for probative evidence. Other 
forms of corroboration that PHR conducted or utilized in this study include:
(5) Physical examinations by a PHR physician of victims of reported human rights violations
(6) Evaluation of medical records of victims of reported human rights violations
(7) Visual verification of actual locations of reported human rights violations
(8) Review of photographic, radiographic, and video evidence 
Interviewees were deemed credible (and data from their testimony was included in this re-
port) if they purported to witness the event, gave a consistent account of events following re-
peated probes, and reported events that coincided with dates and times of known events.
To ensure consistency, investigators followed a semi-structured interview format with probes 
detailing the who, what, why, when, where, and how a reported human rights violation took 
place. To allow for unanticipated issues to arise, investigators combined semi-structured 
questions with open-ended interviewing. Interviews were conducted in English or with Arabic 
interpreters and were held in private settings, often in the witnesses’ homes. In-depth inter-
views lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. PHR investigators obtained oral, informed consent 
from each participant following a detailed explanation of PHR, the purpose of the investiga-
tion, and the potential benefits and risks of participation. All interviews were made anony-
mous by removing identifying information from the interview record. An Ethics Review Board 
convened by PHR approved this study. To minimize the impact on their physical, mental, and 
social integrity, interviewees in this report are referred to under single-name pseudonyms, 
and some identifying information has been removed.
By its nature this study is subject to limitations in duration, scope, and access. The April 2012 
field investigation was relatively short in duration as the research team’s travel was limited; the 
Government of Bahrain only permitted investigators to enter the country for a five-day period. 
The Government of Bahrain has withheld key data that would contribute to full analysis of all re-
ported violations throughout the country, such as information on types of toxic chemical agents 
with severe and possibly lethal effects used on civilian populations. Notwithstanding these limi-
tations, the study produced sufficient firm data on which to make informed recommendations. 
1. PHR uses the term law enforcement officials to mean “all officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, 
who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention.” U.N. Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials art. 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (17 Dec. 1979).
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6 Background
Bahraini protesters calling for political and economic reform began to march on the streets of 
Bahrain’s capital Manama in early 2011. Mostly young and Shi’a,2 they planned their first dem-
onstration3 for 14 February.4 Inspired by recent protests in Egypt and Tunisia, Bahraini pro-
testers camped in Pearl Square, the nation’s symbolic center.5 These unarmed citizens peace-
fully called for a new constitution, an elected government, greater authority for Parliament, 
greater political freedom, and the elimination of discrimination by minority Sunnis in the rul-
ing class against the majority Shi’a population.6
Patterns of toxic chemical agent misuse in Bahrain
The Bahraini government responded to protests with violence and minimal concessions. In 
response to the unrest, government law enforcement officials attacked unarmed protesters 
with toxic chemical agents,7 rubber bullets,8 and birdshot.9 In the first days of the protests, 
several people died and dozens were wounded.10 As protests continued, Bahrain’s law en-
forcement officials began to use toxic chemical agents routinely against civilians.11 In April 
2011, PHR investigators documented cases where Bahraini forces launched toxic chemical 
agents in enclosed spaces, including homes.12
In March 2011, the King of Bahrain declared a three-month state of emergency as pro-democ-
racy protests spread.13 Even under a state of emergency, which authorized Bahrain’s armed 
2. Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy 7, 21 Mar. 2011, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf.
3. This report uses the terms demonstration, protest, and assembly interchangeably.
4. According to the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, “Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights will 
monitor human rights violations against demonstrators and foreigners in Bahrain, on February 14, 2011, 
where a group of young people asking to demonstrate peacefully against human rights violations and calling 
for freedom of opinion and expression and other political demands.” Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, 
http://byshr.org/ (last visited 21 Jun. 2011).
5. Michael Slackman, Bahrain Takes the Stage With a Raucous Protest, New York Times, 15 Feb. 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/02/16/world/middleeast/16bahrain.html. The Pearl Roundabout, found in the center of capital 
cityManama, is surrounded by the Bahrain Central Market, Marina, Pearl and City Center Roundabout 
and the Abraj Al Lulu (Pearl Towers) apartment complex, which is named after the Pearl Monument (no 
longer standing). The PearlMonument contained six dhow “sails” reaching skyward (representing the 
Gulf Cooperation Council’s six member nations), which joined together to hold a pearl at the top (signaling 
Bahrain’s history of pearl cultivation).
6. Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, supra note 2, at 7. 
7. Footage shows crackdown in Bahrain, Al Jazeera, 13 Mar. 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/0
3/201131375850321229.html.
8. Id.
9. Kristen Chick, Bahrain’s Calculated Campaign of Intimidation, Christian Science Monitor, 1 Apr. 2011, http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0401/Bahrain-s-calculated-campaign-of-intimidation.
10. Clashes rock Bahraini capital, Al Jazeera, 17 Feb. 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121
714223324820.html.
11. Physicians for Human Rights, Do No Harm: A Call for Bahrain to End Systematic Attacks on Doctors and 
Patients 10 (2011), http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/bahrain-attacks-on-doctors-2011-04-22.
html. Several groups documented Bahraini law enforcement officials’ use of riot control methods including 
toxic chemical agents and rubber bullets. See e.g., Bahrain Forces Quash Protests, Reuters, 25 Mar. 2011, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bahrain-forces-quash-protests-2253207.html; Christopher 
Hope, Coalition criticized for allowing sales of arms used to suppress democracy protests in Libya and Bahrain, The 
Telegraph, 5 Apr. 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8427138/Coalition-
criticised-for-allowingsales-of-arms-used-to-supress-democracy-protests-in-Libya-and-Bahrain.html; Bahrain: 
Investigate deaths linked to crackdown, The Muslim News, 29 Mar. 2011, http://muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.
php?article=19930; Human Rights Watch, Bahrain: Martial Law Does Not Trump Basic Rights, 16 Mar. 2011, http://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/16/bahrain-martial-law-does-not-trump-basic-rights.
12. Do No Harm: A Call for Bahrain to End Systematic Attacks on Doctors and Patients, supra note 11, at 16, 17. 
See also Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, The Riot Police Continuously Attack Civilians, 27 Jan. 2010, 
http://byshr.org/?p=177.
13. See Barbara Surk and Reem Khalifa, Bahrain’s King Declares State of Emergency, The Washington Times, 
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7forces to “take necessary steps to restore national security,”
14 international law prohibits 
governments from restricting the ‘non-derogable’ right to life and the right to be free from 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.15 Bahrain’s state of emergency was lifted, 
moreover, on 1 June 2011;16 all of the rights violations PHR documents in this report occurred 
after June 2011. 
Bahrain established the Royal Independent 
Investigation Commission (later known as the 
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry) in June 
201117 to investigate alleged gross human rights 
violations in response to the February and March 
2011 protests, as reports of excessive use of toxic 
chemical agents against civilians mounted.18 The 
commission later found that anti-riot police19 used 
toxic chemical agents disproportionately to disperse 
protesters,20 but since that pronouncement, police of-
ficers’ approach to dealing with protesters appears to 
have become even less restrained.21 
Manufacturers of toxic chemical agents 
deployed in Bahrain
Toxic chemical agent canisters in Bahrain appear to come from at least four main manu-
facturers: Brazilian company Condor Non-Lethal Technologies;22 US-based Nonlethal 
Associated Press, 15 Mar. 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/15/official-saudi-soldier-shot-
dead-bahrain/; Bahrain king declares state of emergency after protests, BBC News, 15 Mar. 2011, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12745608. “A state of national safety or martial law shall be proclaimed only by 
Decree. In all cases, martial law cannot be proclaimed for a period exceeding three months. This period may 
not be renewed except with the consent of the majority of the members of the National Assembly present”. 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain art. 36(b), 14 February 2002, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/c
ountry,LEGAL,,LEGISLATION,BHR,4562d8cf2,48b54f262,0.html. 
14. Bahrain’s King Declares State of Emergency, supra note 13.
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(2), 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (acceded 20 Sep. 
2006). See also, Human Rights Watch, Bahrain: Martial Law Does Not Trump Basic Rights, 16 Mar. 2011, http://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/16/bahrain-martial-law-does-not-trump-basic-rights.
16. Bahrain ends state of emergency imposed after protests, BBC News, 1 Jun. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-13616798.
17. HM King Hamad Sets up Royal Independent Investigation Commission, Bahrain News Agency, 29 Jun. 2011, http://
bna.bh/portal/en/news/462963.
18. See Do No Harm: A Call for Bahrain to End Systematic Attacks on Doctors and Patients, supra note 11, at 16. 
19. Riot police in Bahrain wear dark blue military fatigues with flak helmets and olive green pouches, black boots, 
and bulletproof vests. Bahrain has hired foreign mercenaries to serve as riot police. Bahrain Youth Society 
for Human Rights, The Riot Police Continuously Attack Civilians, 27 Jan. 2010, http://byshr.org/?p=177; Ian Black, 
Bahrain security forces accused of deliberately recruiting foreign nationals, The Guardian, 17 Feb. 2011, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/17/bahrain-security-forces-sunni-foreign. 
20. Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI Report), Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry, ¶ 1117 (2011), http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf. 
21. See Bill Law, Bahrain restricts protests on uprising anniversary, BBC, 14 Feb 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-17025148.
22. Evidence from media sources suggests that the toxic chemical agents used against Bahraini protesters were 
manufactured by companies in Brazil, the US and France. The Brazilian newspaper Época reported in December 
2011 that images of a toxic chemical agent canister carrying a “made in Brazil” stamp had been published online 
by Bahraini activists. The canister appears to be a GL-202 Long Range Tear Gas Projectile produced by Brazilian 
company Condor Non-Lethal Technologies. José Antonio Lima and Liuca Yonaha, Gás lacrimôgeneo “made in 
Brazil” é usado na repressão no Bahrein, dizem ativistas, Época (16 Dec. 2012) http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Mundo/
noticia/2011/12/gas-lacrimogeneo-made-brazil-e-usado-na-repressao-no-bahrein-dizem-ativistas.html. Condor Non-
Lethal Technologies, GL-202 Long Range Tear Gas Projectile, Condor Nao Letal, http://www.condornaoletal.com.br/
eng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=93 (last visited 6 Jun. 2012).
A Bahraini man displays an exploded canister of CS gas which was 
shot into his house. Photo: Richard Sollom, PHR
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23 and Federal Laboratories (also known as Defense Technology);24 and 
France-based SAE Alsetex/Etienne Lacroix Group.25
Condor Non-Lethal Technologies has stated that while it does supply weapons to more than 
35 countries, including some in the Arab world, it never exported weaponry to Bahrain.26 
Although Condor would not reveal its clients for reasons of commercial competitiveness, the 
company noted that troops from at least five different countries in the region were operat-
ing inside Bahrain (possibly with Condor-made toxic chemical agents) at the request of the 
Bahraini government.27 At the time of this writing, the Brazilian government has yet to report 
on alleged exports of Condor’s toxic chemical agents to Bahrain.28 
In February 2012, the group “Anonymous” hacked the website of US-based company 
Combined Systems Inc.,29 which exports riot-control equipment to armies around the world.30 
The company has yet to address allegations that it has been a primary riot control agent (RCA) 
supplier to MENA governments embroiled in the Arab Spring.31 Although Combined Systems 
Inc. refuses to comment on whether it exports toxic chemical agents to Bahrain, sources have 
documented the use of canisters bearing its logo in Egypt.32
Governments are the arbiters of whether products such as chemical agents are exported to other 
countries; they have the responsibility to grant or deny export licenses for various products.
History and development of toxic chemical agents
Definition and origins. Tear gas is a term used to refer to a group of toxic chemical agents that 
disable people exposed to them by irritating the lungs, skin, or eyes.33 These agents are also 
called lachrymatory agents, peripheral chemosensory irritants (PCSI), riot control agents 
and harassing agents,34 and qualify as “less-lethal” weapons.35 Toxic lachrymatory chemical 
23. In December 2011, the New York Times reported that tear gas shells made by US company Nonlethal 
Technologies were “being swept off the street each morning” in Bahrain. Nicholas Kristof, Repressing 
Democracy, With American Arms, New York Times (17 Dec. 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/
sunday/kristof-repressing-democracy-with-american-arms.html?_r=1.
24. Bahrain Watch Blog, Arms Watch Tracking the Governments and arms dealers fueling the bloodshed, 14 Feb. 
2012, http://bahrainwatch.org/arms.html.
25. A photograph published in The Telegraph shows a collection of spent toxic chemical agent canisters in 
Bahrain’s Pearl Square, which appear identical to canisters produced by France’s Etienne Lacroix Group. 
The Telegraph, Bahrain protests escalate: Saudi Arabia sends troops to help restore security, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/8381142/Bahrain-protests-escalate-Saudi-Arabia-sends-
troops-to-help-restore-security.html?image=6 (last visited 6 Jun. 2012); Etienne Lacroix Group, Munitions, 
Grenades,Disperseurs, Lacroix DS, http://www.lacroixds.com/catalogue.html (last visited 6 Jun. 2012).
26. Gás lacrimôgeneo “made in Brazil”, supra note 22. 
27. Id.
28. The Brazilian government noted that it would have no investigative power over Condor’s sale of toxic chemical 
agents to Bahrain given that the contract would be between two private parties. Rasheed Abou-Alsamh, Who 
will investigate the use of Brazilian tear gas in Bahrain?, 11 Mar. 2012, http://www.rasheedsworld.com/wp/2012/03/
who-will-investigate-the-use-of-brazilian-tear-gas-in-bahrain/.
29. The Atlantic Wire, Anonymous Marks Bahrain Protest by Hacking U.S. Tear Gas Company, 14 Feb. 2012, http://www.
theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/02/anonymous-marks-bahrain-protest-hacking-us-tear-gas-company/48669/. 
30. Washington Post Blog, Anonymous marks Bahrain anniversary by hacking U.S. tear gas company, 14 Feb. 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/anonymous-marks-bahrain-anniversary-by-hacking-us-tear-
gas-company/2012/02/14/gIQAilOVDR_blog.html.
31. Amnesty International, USA repeatedly shipped arms supplies to Egyptian security forces, 7 Dec. 2011, http://www.
amnesty.org/en/news/usa-repeatedly-shipped-arms-supplies-egyptian-security-forces-2011-12-06. 
32. Id. 
33. Toxic chemical lachrymatory agents induce incapacitation by irritating the respiratory system, mucous 
membranes, skin or eyes. Indiana State Department of Health, Facts about Riot Control Agents, http://www.
in.gov/isdh/24339.htm (last visited 7 Jun. 2011).
34. Id.
35. Less-lethal weapons include tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, pepper spray, lasers, conducted energy 
devices, and Fentanyl. Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Policy Statement on Less 
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36 At least 15 chemi-
cals have been used worldwide as harassing agents,37 with CS gas38 being the most commonly 
used by law enforcement for crowd control.39 PHR uses the term “toxic chemical agents” 
instead of tear gas in this report to underscore the toxicity of these chemicals. “Tear gas,” im-
plying that these chemical agents merely cause tearing, is a misnomer. 
Precursors to today’s lachrymatory riot control agents40 may have been used against civilian 
populations as early as 1912,41 and militaries employed toxic lachrymatory agents as weapons 
for the first time in 1914.42 Some of the chemicals used in today’s riot control agents, however, 
evolved from chemical weapons developed as early as the 1800s.43 CS gas was identified as a 
lachrymatory agent in 192844 and was weaponized in the mid-1950s.45 The letters “CS” stand 
for the initials of B.B. Corson and R.W. Stoughton, American chemists who discovered the 
properties of the chemical in 1928.46 Toxic lachrymatory agents and other chemical warfare-
agents (CWAs) were used extensively throughout both World Wars I and II.47 The United States 
used CS gas on the battlefield for the first time during the 1960s Vietnam War.48 
Responding to widespread use of chemical weapons on the battlefield during WWI, over 30 
countries signed a UN protocol in 1925 that prohibited the use of poisonous gases in war.49 
Lethal Weapons, 20 Feb. 2011, http://parliamentaryforum.org/sites/default/files/parlforum_policy_statement_on_
less_lethal_weapons_final.pdf.
36. Facts about Riot Control Agents, supra note 33.
37. Howard Hu, et al., Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, 262 JAMA 660 (4 Aug. 1989). Among 
these chemicals are CA gas, which was one of the first toxic chemical lachrymatory agents used and is now 
obsolete, and CN gas, which was discovered in 1869 and has been replaced largely by CS gas. USAF Institute 
for National Security Studies, Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References, INSS Occasional Paper 15, 25 (1996), 
available at http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp15.pdf.
38. CS gas is known scientifically as o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile with a molecular formula of C10H5CIN2. 
When combined with other agents, it can be easily dispersed. B.L. Danto, Medical problems and criteria 
regarding the use of tear gas by police, 8 Am J Forensic Med Pathol 317, 319 (1987); Jay P Sanford, Medical aspects 
of riot control (harassing) agents, 27 Annu Rev Med. 421, 423 (1976). 
39. Yakubu. G. Karagama et al., Short-term and long-term physical effects of exposure to CS spray, 96 J R Soc Med 
172,172 (2003).
40. Ethylbromacetate, a strong lachrymatory agent, was developed in 1858 and later became the first “combat 
gas” of World War I. The chemical chloracetone largely replaced ethylbromacetate in 1914. An even more 
potent lachrymator, xylyl bromide, was first used in 1915. Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A 
Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen 118 (2001).
41. French authorities used Ethylbromoacetate to control violent mobs and incapacitate criminals. Id. 
42. The French army reportedly launched grenades containing the substance Ethylbromacetate at the German army. Id. 
43. The invention of chlorine, one of the earliest recognizable chemical weapons, is attributed to the Swedish 
chemist Carl Scheele in 1774. Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of 
America, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare 10 (1997), available at http://www.opas.org.
br/ambiente/quimicos/fulltex/armas/textos/chebio/chebio.pdf#page=24. British chemist John Davey created 
phosgene, a choking agent nearly ten times as toxic as chlorine, in 1812. Together with chlorine, phosgene was 
responsible for more deaths in WWI than any other chemical agent. Scientists in both Germany and the United 
Kingdom created sulphur mustard (SM) in 1860. Invented explicitly as a weapon of mass destruction, SM 
was the earliest form of mustard gas. Ladislaus Szinicz, History of chemical and biological warfare agents, 214 
Toxicology 167, 174-175 (2005), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0300483X05002829. 
44. CS, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989, online version Mar. 2011). 
45. Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, supra note 37, at 661. CS gas was used in Cyprus and 
British Guyana in 1956. Brian Rappert, Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces? Technology, Politics, and 
the Management of Conflict 35 (2003). 
46. Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 44; Medical problems and criteria regarding the use of tear gas by police, 
supra note 38, at 319.
47. Initially, CWAs were available only to countries with advanced chemical industries; however, by the end of 
the century they were produced and used by countries with less-developed industries as well as terrorist 
organizations. James A. Romano, Jr., et al., Chemical Warfare Agents: Chemistry, Pharmacology, Toxicology, 
and Therapeutics 627 (James A. Romano Jr. et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
48. Non-Lethal Weapons as Legitimizing Forces?, supra note 45, at 35.
49. There are currently 132 States Party to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 Jun. 1925, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/280?OpenDocument (Bahrain ratified 12 Sep. 1988). 
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10 However, countries continued to develop and stockpile chemical and biological weapons fol-
lowing WWI and throughout the 20th century.50 The need for comprehensive international 
standards regulating the use and development of chemical weapons became apparent, es-
pecially following countries’ abuse of many different chemical agents both for use in combat 
during war and against their own civilians.51
In 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) effectively prohibited the use of chemical 
and biological weapons in warfare, and promoted disarmament.52 The CWC, however, allows 
law enforcement officials to use some chemical agents during periods of peacetime or civil 
unrest.53 The convention calls permissible chemicals “riot control agents” and stipulates that 
these agents must have effects which disappear shortly after exposure.54 Lack of state con-
sensus at the time of the CWC’s drafting may explain why the Convention does not forbid use 
of chemical agents by law enforcement personnel. It has been suggested that domestic regu-
lation of chemical agents did not take precedence and therefore was unable to be resolved.55
Global use. Within the past year and a half, governments of Arab Spring countries includ-
ing Bahrain,56 Egypt,57 Libya,58 Syria,59 Tunisia,60 and Yemen61 have deployed toxic chemical 
agents against civilians. Other governments that have recently deployed toxic chemical agents 
50. History of chemical and biological warfare agents, supra note 43, at 167-181; Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, Basic Facts on Chemical Disarmament, http://www.opcw.org/news--publications/publications/
history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention/ (last visited 19 Jun. 2012).
51. Examples include abuse of chemical agents in Vietnam (by the United States) and Iran (by Iraq) as well as their 
use against civilians by the Iraqi government and Japanese terrorists. Chemical Warfare Agents: Chemistry, 
Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutics, supra note 47, at 628-630; History of chemical and biological 
warfare agents, supra note 43, at 172.
52. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was the result of 12 years of negotiations, which aimed to prohibit 
“the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons.” 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and their Destruction (“Chemical Weapons Convention”) art. 1, 13 Jan. 1993, available at http://www.opcw.org/
chemical-weapons-convention/ (Bahrain ratified 28 Apr. 1997).
53. As party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Bahrain is permitted to employ certain toxic chemicals 
for, inter alia, purposes of scientific and medical research; protection against chemical weapons; military 
purposes that do not rely on toxic chemicals as agents of warfare; and law enforcement including domestic 
riot control purposes. Id., at art. 2.9(a)-(d). 
54. “‘Riot Control Agent’ means: Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans 
sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of 
exposure.” Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 52, at art. 2.7.
55. Matthew Meselson & Julien Perry Robinson, “Law Enforcement” and the CWC, 58 The CBW Conventions Bulletin 
1, 1-2 (2002) (Discusses the need for clarifications in the CWC), available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/
bulletin/cbwcb58.pdf. Whether the CWC allows States to develop and use incapacitating chemical agents as 
well as well as riot control agents for domestic law enforcement is an ongoing subject of debate. Arms Control 
Today, The Chemical Weapons Convention at 10: An Interview with OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter, Apr. 2007, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/Pfirter. Absence of regulation regarding use of chemical agents for 
domestic law enforcement may have encouraged their misuse. For instance, in the 2002 Moscow hostage 
crisis, some 160 deaths could be passed off as legal. “Law Enforcement” and the CWC, supra note 55, at 1-2.
56. Physicians for Human Rights, Tear Gas or Lethal Gas? Bahrain’s Death Toll Mounts to 34, Mar. 2012 http://
physiciansforhumanrights.org/blog/tear-gas-or-lethal-gas.html. 
57. See Amnesty International, Egypt: Systematic failure to rein in security forces, 22 Feb. 2012, http://www.amnesty.
org/en/news/egypt-systematic-failure-rein-security-forces-2012-02-22; BBC News, UN human rights chief Navi Pillay 
condemns Cairo deaths, 23 Nov. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15854418. 
58. See Aaron Gray-Block, Exclusive: Gaddafi pre-planned attacks on civilians: prosecutor, Reuters, 5 Apr. 2011, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/05/us-libya-icc-exclusive-idUSTRE73443V20110405. 
59. See Liam Stack and Neil MacFarquhar, Syrian Protesters Clash with Security Forces, NY Times, 1 Apr. 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/middleeast/02syria.html.
60. See Reuters, Tunisia’s Ban on Protests in Capital Is Reversed, 11 Apr. 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/
world/africa/tunisias-ban-on-habib-bourguiba-avenue-protests-is-reversed.html?_r=1&ref=tunisia; Tunisia: Police 
Tear-Gas Demonstrators, 15 July 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/africa/16briefs-Tunisia.html .
61. See Portia Walker, Police Fire On Demonstrators in Yemen, 9 Mar. 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2011/03/08/AR2011030805594.html.
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11against their civilian populations include Chile,
62 Honduras,63 Israel,64 Panama,65 Turkey,66 and 
Uganda.67 Such tactics are not a new phenomenon. For decades governments have launched 
attacks against civilians with toxic chemical agents.68 Perhaps most similar to the Bahraini 
context, authorities in South Korea in 1987 used hundreds of thousands of canisters of toxic 
chemical agents over the course of two months (June and July) in the streets of Seoul to crush 
civilian uprisings.69 Just as in Bahrain, civilians exposed to high quantities of toxic chemical 
agents in South Korea suffered acute illnesses and severe health impairments; affected indi-
viduals went without medical attention for fear of police and government harassment.70
Types of chemical riot-control agents and their effects
o-Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS, CS1, CS2). The chemical CS remains the most com-
monly used lachrymatory riot control agent today.71 Symptoms of CS exposure include severe 
tearing, burning in the nose and throat, eye spasms, chest tightness, coughing, and wheez-
ing among other signs of oral and respiratory distress.72 Scientists have also reformulated 
62. Police in Chile used toxic chemical lachrymatory agents against more than 30,000 civilians protesting 
against a hydroelectric dam, and temporarily stopped using the chemical agents over concerns that these 
lachrymatory agents may lead to miscarriages. Latin America News Dispatch, Chile Suspends Use of Tear 
Gas Amid Concerns Over Miscarriages, 19 May 2011, http://latindispatch.com/2011/05/19/chile-suspends-use-of-
tear-gas-amid-concerns-over-miscarriages/; Latin America News Dispatch, Chilean Government Resumes Use of 
Tear Gas As HidroAysén Protests Continue, 25 May 2011, http://latindispatch.com/2011/05/25/chilean-government-
resumes-use-of-tear-gas-as-hidroaysen-protests-continue/. 
63. “There were credible reports in March 2011 that members of the national police fired tear gas canisters 
indiscriminately and beat people with batons during demonstrations by teachers’ unions protesting proposed 
changes in the public education system.” Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Honduras 2 (2012, http://
www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-chapter-honduras; Amnesty International, Stock pile of tear gas 
grenades in Honduras triggers fears of human rights abuses, 27 Nov. 2009, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/country,,AMNESTY,COUNTRYNEWS,HND,,4b14e7a6c,0.html. 
64. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
has noted Israel’s use of toxic chemical lachrymatory agents. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/17/Add.2, 11 
Jun. 2012, http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/47d4e277b48d9d3685256ddc00612265/68a8430f7c1ae73285257a1c00512
d46?OpenDocument. PHR reported on the use of toxic chemical agents by the IDF in 1988, documenting reports 
that soldiers threw and shot tear gas into homes, stores and hospitals. Physicians for Human Rights, The 
Casualties of Conflict: Medical Care and Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1988).
65. “Disputes over mining rights in western Panama have led to violent confrontations between indigenous 
groups and Panamanian security forces... Panamanian Security Services continue to use tear gas and other 
riot control measures.” US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Services, Travel Alert: Panama, 5 Feb. 
2012, https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=11944. PHR reported in 1987 that chemical 
agent canisters being shot into homes, classrooms, and cars “were clearly labeled: ‘For outdoor use only-
may cause severe injuries-give medical aid to persons seriously affected.’” Physicians for Human Rights, 
Panama 1987: Health Consequences of Police and Military Actions: The Report of a Medical Fact-Finding 
Mission of Physicians for Human Rights (1987), http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/panama-
1987-health.html.
66. See World Without Torture, Tear gas: Is it a violation of human rights?, 31 May 2012, http://worldwithouttorture.
org/tag/european-court-of-human-rights/; Al Jazeera, Turkish police clash with Kurdish protesters, 18 Mar. 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012318173842690891.html; Frederike Geerdink, The wrong 
discussion about tear gas, Journalistinturkey.com, 13 Apr. 2012, http://www.journalistinturkey.com/blogs/the-
wrong-discussion-about-tear-gas_3068/. 
67. See Reuters, Ugandan police fire teargas, disperse opposition vigil, 17 Aug. 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/
topNews/idAFJOE77G0F120110817; BBC News, Uganda: Police tear gas ‘walk-to-work’ protesters, 14 April 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13078400. 
68. Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, supra note 37, at 660.
69. According to media sources, The Republic of Korea used 351,000 toxic chemical agent grenades and canisters 
in June 1987 alone. Physicians for Human Rights, The Use of Tear Gas in the Republic of Korea 1 (1987), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/korea-1987-use-of-tear-gas-in-republic-of-korea.pdf. 
70. Id., at 4.
71. Short-term and long-term physical effects of exposure to CS spray, supra note 39, at 172-174. 
72. Id., at 172; B Ballantyne and DW Swanston, The comparative acute mammalian toxicity of 1-chloroacetophenone 
(CN) and 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), 40 Arch Toxicol 75, 76 (1978) http://www.springerlink.com/content/
m17075801362u733/.
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12 CS into the chemical agents CS1
73 and CS2,74 which increase both the severity and duration of 
tearing effects of CS.75 CS1 stays active when it settles onto the ground, re-aerosolizing when 
touched.76 CS1 can remain active for 14 days in an enclosed space, and about one week in open 
air (long after a given protest is over).77 CS2, which is water-resistant, is so potent that wetting 
an exposed part of the body can re-activate the gas and regenerate the toxins.78 Chemicals 
in CS2 remain toxic for about one month after being released, although particles can remain 
active for two months or more (the chemicals are extremely potent, and water cannot wash 
them away).79 CS, like other toxic chemical agents, may be released through pressurized de-
vices such as spray cans or guns, or explosive cartridges that release the toxic agent through 
a powder charge.80 Grenades may also release CS in aerosol form; aerosol CS has been 
known to cause blistering at close range.81 
Chloracetophenone (CN). The most toxic chemical lachrymatory agent currently available is 
chloracetophenone (CN),82 which irritates the skin and eyes more than CS.83 As a result, CS 
gas has generally replaced CN as a riot control agent in many countries, as it is thought to be 
less toxic84—although Handheld Mace still contains a small percentage of CN.85 Though acute 
effects of exposure to CN are similar to effects of exposure to CS,86 CN has a greater potential 
to cause corneal damage, especially when cartridges have expired.87 The lachrymatory prop-
73. CS1 is a free-flowing powder, in which CS is combined with silica aerogel, which increases fluidity and water 
resistance. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-11 - Flame, Riot Control Agents, and Herbicide Operations, 6-1, FM 
3-11/MCRP 3-3.7.2 (19 Aug. 1996), available at http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-3-11-flame-riot-control-
agents-and-herbicide-operations.shtml.
74. CS2 is blended with silicone-treated silica aerogel, which enables it to repel water. USAF Institute for National 
Security Studies, supra note 37, at 26.
75. Id., at 26.
76. U.S. Army Field Manual, supra note 73, at 6-2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; USAF Institute for National Security Studies, supra note 37, at 25.
80. “[S]ome containers discharge a stream of the solution and some discharge a mist or fine particulate cloud… 
[Another type] contains tear gas dispersed by means of a small powder charge.” JR Gaskins, et al., Lacrimating 
agents (CS and CN) in rats and rabbits, 24 Arch Environ Health 449, 449 (1972). See also S. Varma and P.J.A Holt, 
Severe cutaneous reaction to CS gas, 26(3) Clin Exp Dermatol. 248, 249 (May 2001), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.
ezproxy.bu.edu/doi/10.1046/j.1365-2230.2001.00806.x/pdf. The tools of tear gas employment can be dangerous 
themselves. Heat, flames, and chemical reactions generated by tear gas grenades and launchers can produce 
burns. The gas pressure and velocity of canisters released at close range create sizable contact wounds, 
excessive bleeding, and internal damage. When directed at the head or neck, this damage can be fatal. MA 
Rothschild and K Vendura, Fatal neck injuries caused by blank cartridges, 101 Forensic Sci Int. 151, 151-158 (26 
Apr 1999); Franck Clarot, et al., Lethal head injury due to tear-gas cartridge gunshots, 137 Forensic Sci Int. 45, 48-
51 (14 Oct. 2003).
81. Medical aspects of riot control (harassing) agents, supra note 38, at 421-424; P Holland and RG White, The 
cutaneous reactions produced by CS and CN when applied directly to the skin of human subjects, 86 Br J Dermatol 
150, 150-154 (1972) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bjd.1972.86.issue-2/issuetoc. For a detailed 
explanation of cutaneous responses to CS, see DA Wiegand, Cutaneous reactions to the riot control agent CS, 134 
Milit Med 437, 437-440 (1969).
82. Chemical and Biological Warfare, supra note 40, at 118. See also U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
Chemical Defense, Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents (ed. Ramesh C. Gupta) (2009), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539686.
83. “w-Chlorocetophenone has been shown to present a far greater cutaneous hazard than 
o-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile when applied directly to the skin.” The cutaneous reactions produced by CS 
and CN when applied directly to the skin of human subjects, supra note 81, at 150. See also Lacrimating agents (CS 
and CN) in rats and rabbits, supra note 80, at 452.
84. Id. “Fatalities have occurred following intense, prolonged exposure to CN.” Medical aspects of riot control 
(harassing) agents, supra note 81, at 426. Studies show that CS, when ingested or inhaled, is significantly less 
likely than CN to cause tissue damage. The comparative acute mammalian toxicity of 1-chloroacetophenone (CN) 
and 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), supra note 72, at 75.
85. Chemical Mace contains 0.9% CN. USAF Institute for National Security Studies, supra note 37, at 25.
86.    “The acute transient clinical effects of both CN and CS are quite similar…” Medical aspects of riot control 
(harassing) agents, supra note 81, at 424.
87.    “If the CN cartridges are too old and the agent does not vaporize adequately, small solid particles may strike 
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13erties of CN gas were discovered in Germany in 1869, and Japan may have been first to use CN 
gas on the battlefield.88 
Dibenz (b, f)-1, 4-oxazepine (CR). CR89 is another toxic chemical agent and is at least five times 
more potent than CS.90 British scientists developed CR gas in 1962.91 Persons exposed to CR 
gas experience painful photophobia as well as a burning sensation that intensifies on damp 
skin. CR remains active in the environment for 60 days, at least as long as CS2.92 CR gas be-
came known as “fire gas” in 1974 following its use in Northern Ireland, owing to the burning 
sensation it causes.93
Oleoresin capsicum (OC) and pelargonic acid vanillylamide (PAVA). Law enforcement officers 
are also increasingly using pepper spray (OC or PAVA)94 as a riot control agent (often instead 
of Chemical Mace),95 which causes tearing and burning when sprayed directly into a person’s 
face as riot control agents.96 The principal chemical in pepper spray is oleoresin capsicum 
(OC), which comes from the capsaicin in chili peppers.97 PAVA is a synthesized capsaicin that, 
when directed at a person’s eyes, can reportedly cause more pain than CS gas.98
Medical hazards of exposure to toxic chemical agents
Longitudinal or population-based studies on the long-term effects of toxic lachrymatory 
agents on repeatedly exposed humans do not exist, because no government is known to have 
deployed toxic lachrymatory agents against a civilian population for an extended period of 
time.99 Some tests, however, have shown that CS gas can damage chromosomes and change 
DNA, raising the potential of these agents to cause long-term carcinogenic100 and deleteri-
ous reproductive effects,101 as well as concerns about their long-term harmful effects on the 
the cornea and cause damage.” Medical problems and criteria regarding the use of tear gas by police, supra note 
46, at 320 (1987).
88. Chemical and Biological Warfare, supra note 40, at 118.
89. CR can be dispersed as a 0.1% CR solution comprised of 80% propylene glycol and 20% water. USAF Institute 
for National Security Studies, supra note 37, at 25. 
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. U.S. Army Field Manual, supra note 73, at 6-3. 
93. USAF Institute for National Security Studies, supra note 37, at 25.
94. Chemical and Biological Warfare, supra note 40, at 118. 
95. USAF Institute for National Security Studies, supra note 37, at 27.
96. OC does not vaporize or emit fumes capable of incapacitating wide-reaching groups of people. U.S. Army 
Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, supra note 82, at 157.
97. Chemical and Biological Warfare, supra note 40, at 118.
98. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, supra note 82, at 158.
99. Lakshaman Karalliedde et al., Possible immediate and long-term health effects following exposure to chemical 
warfare agents, 114 Public Health 238, 246 (2000).
100. Scientists determined in the 1970s that CS “suppressed non-specific esterase activity to a similar extent 
as the potent carcinogen 7, 12-dimethylbenz[a]anthracene.” LF Chasseaud, et al., Suppression of sebaceous 
gland non-specific esterase activity by electrophilic alpha beta-unsaturated compounds, 31 Experientia 1196, 1196 
(1975) http://www.springerlink.com/content/r55l818731k09081/. “CS should be fully investigated for carcinogenic 
activity.” DH Barry, et al., The suppression of non-specific esterase activity in mouse skin sebaceous gland by CS gas, 
240 Nature 560, 561 (1972) http://www.nature.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/nature/journal/v240/n5383/abs/240560a0.html. 
See also Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, Hu et al., supra note 37, at 660. But cf. E Zeiger, et 
al., Salmonella mutagenicity tests, III: results from the testing of 225 chemicals, 9 Environ Mol Mutagen 1, 4 (1987), 
which found that an increase in results could not necessarily be attributed to CS application; some animal 
studies claim to have disproven the mutagenic and carcinogenic potential of CS gas deployed in appropriate 
concentrations and in open space. Bernard P McNamara, et al., CS: A Study of Carcinogenicity, National 
Technical Information Service (Nov. 1973); Albert Von Daniken, et al., Tests for mutagenicity in Salmonella and 
covalent binding to DNA and protein in the rat of the riot control agent o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), 49 
Arch Toxicol 15, 15 (1981); Dieter Wild, et al.,  Genotoxicity study of CS (ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile) in 
Salmonella, Drosophila, and mice, 54 Arch Toxicol 167, 167 (1983). 
101. Physicians for Human Rights spoke to physicians in the Gaza Strip in the 1980s, who reported some 40 cases 
of intra-uterine fetal birth. “All these cases were among women who noticed the absence of fetal movement  
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14 pulmonary system following inhalation.
102 In addition, these toxic chemical agents can cause 
severe burns including (1) chemical burns resulting from direct contact with CS; (2) contact 
burns from touching the CS canisters; and (3) flame burns, when a grenade explodes too 
close to an individual.103 It has also been suggested that CS inhalation may cause breathing 
complications, such as laryngospasm that can complicate operative procedures.104
If a person exposed to toxic chemical agents leaves the saturated area quickly, symptoms 
of exposure can dissipate within 15 minutes, but can also last for hours.105 This has led pro-
ponents of toxic chemical agent use to argue that when used properly, chemical riot control 
agents are nonlethal and therefore safe.106 Toxic chemical agents are often used improperly, 
however, and scientists and law enforcement agencies alike have found that these agents 
can lead to fatalities107 when employed indiscriminately and with disproportionate force.108 
According to one recent study published by the Federation of American Scientists, incapaci-
tating chemical agents authorized for crowd control purposes might prove fatal for 10% of 
those exposed.109 
two to three days after exposure to tear gas when soldiers had entered their camps or villages.” Physicians 
for Human Rights, The Casualties of Conflict, supra note 64, at 19. But cf. PR McElhatton, S Sidhu, and SHL 
Thomas, Exposure to CS Gas in Pregnancy, 24 Journal of Toxicology: Clinical Toxicology 547, 547 (Jun. 2004), 
which collected data on 30 women exposed to toxic chemical agents during pregnancy and concluded that “in 
the absence of severe maternal toxicity an increased risk of fetal toxicity is unlikely.”
102. Inhalation of excessive amounts of CS gas can cause lung damage leading to asphyxiation or, less 
frequently, acquired pneumonia. The comparative acute mammalian toxicity of 1-chloroacetophenone (CN) 
and 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), supra note 72, at 93. One study found that “the possible cause 
of upper airway and bronchial obstruction was respiratory tract injury after CS spray inhalation... We 
suggest that laryngeal and bronchial obstruction constitutes a life-threatening condition that might 
result from CS spray inhalation.” E Karaman, et al., Acute laryngeal and bronchial obstruction after CS 
(o-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile) gas inhalation, 266 Eur Arch Otorhinolaryngol 301, 303 (Feb. 2009). See also 
TC Marrs, et al., A repeated dose study of the toxicity of inhaled 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) aerosol 
in three species of laboratory animals, 52 Arch Toxicol 183, 192 (1983) http://www.springerlink.com/content/
hr276vv375183053/; Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, supra note 37, at 660.
103. Yuvraj Agrawal, et al., CS gas—Completely safe? A burn case report and literature review, 35(6) Burns 895, 896 
(Sep. 2009); AM Zekri, et al., Acute mass burns caused by o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) tear gas, 21 Burns 
586, 586 (Dec. 1995).
104. “[L]aryngospasm may occur hours after CS spray exposure…. [A]nesthetists should be aware that patients 
exposed to CS spray may be at risk of airway problems hours after exposure.” A Davey & IK Moppett, 
Postoperative complications after CS spray exposure, 59 Anesthesia 1219, 1220 (Dec. 2004).
105. A. R. Hill et al., Medical Hazards of the Tear Gas CS: A Case of Persistent, Multisystem, Hypersensitivity Reaction and 
Review of the Literature, 79 Medicine 236, 236-40 (2000).
106. Frederick Fraunfelder, Is CS gas dangerous? 320 BMJ 458, 459 (2000); Medical problems and criteria regarding the 
use of tear gas by police, supra note 46, at 320.; P.G. Blain, Tear gases and irritant incapacitants.1-chloroacetophenone, 
2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile and dibenz[b, f]-1,4-oxazepine, 22 Toxicol Rev 103, 103-110 (2003).
107. “Death is usually the result of excessive concentrations used, confined spaces, and prolonged exposures.” 
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, supra note 82, at 168. See also U.S. Department of 
Justice, Review of the Department of Justice’s Use of Less-Lethal Weapons, May 2009, http://www.justice.gov/oig/
reports/plus/e0903/final.pdf. 
108. Force is “disproportionate” when it is not “in proportion to the seriousness of the offense and legitimate 
objective to be achieved” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 
at art. 5(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (18 Dec. 1990). “Some of the adverse clinical effects from RCA 
exposure reported in the literature have involved indiscriminate use (excessive concentrations), prolonged 
exposure, and dissemination of compound in a confined space.” U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
Chemical Defense, supra note 82, at 170. In laboratory animals, “[e]xcess mortality was noted in high dose 
groups of all three species … harm was related to the high concentration (Ct) of CS…” A repeated dose study 
of the toxicity of inhaled 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) aerosol, supra note 102, at 183, 196, http://www.
springerlink.com/content/hr276vv375183053/. See also Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
supra note 35, at 1. 
109. Lynn Klotz et al., Beware the Siren’s Song: Why “Non-Lethal” Incapacitating Chemical Agents are Lethal, 7-8 (2003), 
http://www.fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/documents/sirens_song.pdf. See also ICRC, Incapacitating Chemical 
Agents: Implications for International Law, 20, 24-26 Mar. 2010, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/
icrc-002-4051.pdf. 
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15Toxic chemical agent vapors accumulate in low areas
110 and do not disperse easily when can-
isters are detonated in confined spaces. As a result, health effects of exposure to these toxic 
chemical agents in confined spaces may be both prolonged and more severe.111 Consistent ex-
posure to high doses of riot control agents in enclosed spaces has been shown to cause acute 
lung damage112 and death.113 
Repeated exposure to toxic chemical agents may lead to increased sensitization such that 
subsequent exposures can result in increased health complications.114 Exposure to toxic 
chemical agents at close range increases the potential for toxic chemical substances to enter 
bodily tissues, which can compromise and inflame immune systems and cause chronic symp-
toms.115 Various factors affect the impact of toxic chemical agents on an individual, including 
whether the gas is delivered in solution or aerosol form, the length of exposure, temperature 
of surroundings, humidity (high temperature and humidity increase skin reactions116), age, and 
whether the exposed person has other diseases.117
In light of the severe detrimental health impacts noted by the Bahrain Independent Commission 
of Inquiry and this report, it is crucial that Bahraini authorities publicly identify which types of 
toxic chemical agents they use against civilians to allow further medical research and develop-
ment of specific usage guidelines.118 Bahraini officials have not responded to PHR’s request for a 
list of toxic chemical agents the government deploys and their concentrations.119
110. D. Hank Ellison, Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents 405 (CRC Press ed, 2d ed. 2008).
111. “When used at higher levels, in confined spaces and/or for prolonged duration, there is a greater potential for 
the toxicity to escalate.” U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, supra note 82, at 168. 
112. Histologic findings included “pulmonary vascular congestion, accompanied in severe cases by focal 
hemorrhages and edema.” Medical Hazards of the Tear Gas CS, supra note 105, at 237.
113. “In enclosed places, prolonged exposure to the resulting high dosages of RCAs can kill or disable personnel 
and can cause serious physiological reactions.” U.S. Army Field Manual, supra note 73, at 6-1. See CW 
Chung & AL Giles Jr.,  Sensitization of guinea pigs to alpha-chloroacetophenone (CN) and ortho-chlorobenzylidene 
malono-nitrile (CS), tear gas chemical, 109 J Immunol 284, 284 (1972) http://www.jimmunol.org.ezproxy.bu.edu/
content/109/2/284.long; Tear Gas—Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, supra note 37, at 661.But cf. Medical 
problems and criteria regarding the use of tear gas by police, supra note 46, at 320, which found that CS has a 
safety factor of 2,600, meaning that “2,600 times as much as is required to affect humans would be required 
to be fatal.”
114. “Persons sensitized by a previous contact with CN or other tear gas ingredient may develop serious complications 
on a second encounter…” Sensitization of guinea pigs to alpha-chloroacetophenone (CN) and ortho-chlorobenzylidene 
malono-nitrile (CS), supra note 113, at 291. Sensitization may be more readily produced and more severe with 
repeated exposure to CN. Lacrimating agents (CS and CN) in rats and rabbits, supra note 80, at 452.
115. “Tear gas chemicals, especially CN may enter into the tissues of eyes or bones of human victims who 
are fired upon at close ranges and may generate severe immunologic responses if the chemical is 
released continuously. Some of the chronic clinical symptoms of such victims might have been due to 
immunologic inflammatory reactions.” Sensitization of guinea pigs to alpha-chloroacetophenone (CN) and ortho-
chlorobenzylidene malono-nitrile (CS), supra note 113, at 291.
116. Even when used appropriately tear gas can induce severe contact dermatitis, especially if the victim develops 
an allergic reaction. NS Penneys, RM Israel, and SM Indgin, Contact dermatitis due to 1-chloroacetophenone and 
chemical mace, 281 N Engl J Med 413, 413-415 (1969). Symptoms are also exacerbated in hot or humid weather. 
Tear Gas—Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, supra note 37, at 661.
117. Symptoms of RCA exposure depend on both dose and duration of exposure. Pre-existing asthma and 
underlying cardiac disease has been shown to exacerbate toxicity. When released as an aerosol, particles 
can accumulate and cause corneal abrasions when they penetrate the eye. U.S. Army Medical Research 
Institute of Chemical Defense, supra note 82, at 155, 163-165. The very young and very old may face a greater 
risk of negative health effects due to toxic chemical agent exposure. Elspeth Worthington & Patrick A Nee, 
CS exposure-clinical effects and management, 16 Accid Emerg Med 168, 168-170 (1999) http://emj.bmj.com/
content/16/3/168.full.pdf+html. See also CL Punte, et al., Exposures to orthochlorobenzylidene malononitrile, 6 
Arch Environ Health 366, 366-74 (1964). One study determined that a 4-month year old died from pneumonia 
developed after exposure to CS gas. Sungmin Park & Samuel T. Giammona, Toxic Effects of Tear Gas on an Infant 
Following Prolonged Exposure, 123 Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med. 245, 245-246 (1972).
118. Interview with key informant no. 11, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012). 
119. PHR requested this information when investigators met with Bahraini Ministry of the Interior officials on 11 
April 2012.
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16 Bahraini government violates Un principles on the  
use of force during protests
Analysis from PHR’s April 2012 investigation in Bahrain reveals that Bahraini law enforcement 
officials routinely deployed excessive force while using riot-control agents against civilian 
protesters.120 Specifically, PHR concludes that Bahraini police (1) failed to exercise restraint121 
before resorting to force; (2) used disproportionate force122 when responding to protesters; 
and (3) failed to minimize damage and injury to demonstrators.123 Based on this analysis, 
Physicians for Human Rights concludes that such unrestrained use of toxic chemical agents 
against a civilian population has caused gratuitous—and sometimes life-threatening—harm to 
men, women, and children in Bahrain. 
Bahraini law enforcement officials use preemptive and excessive force 
All 32 eyewitnesses exposed to toxic chemical agents whom PHR interviewed reported that 
law enforcement officials failed to employ gradations of force when confronting peaceful 
demonstrators.124 Police reportedly used force preemptively125 to disperse peaceful gather-
ings. This preemptive action contravenes UN guidelines, which mandate that law enforcement 
officials begin with nonviolent means before using force or firearms.126 For example, riot po-
lice routinely accost peaceful protesters and immediately use force to disperse participants 
before engaging in dialogue or other nonviolent tactics.127 
One eyewitness reported that while participating in a small demonstration alongside approximately 
50 other people in his Shi’a village in February 2012, scores of police wearing dark blue uniforms 
arrived at the scene, split into three groups, and suddenly, without warning, began to attack the 
120. United Nations best practices on the use of force state the importance of employing non-violent means before 
resorting to use of force; exercising restraint and proportionality; minimizing damage and injury; ensuring 
that the injured receive assistance and medical aid; ensuring that relatives of the injured are notified; and 
promptly reporting deaths to officials, among other measures. U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force, 
supra note 108, art. 5(a)-(d), 6. PHR’s findings are corroborated by findings of the Bahrain Independent 
Commission of Inquiry, which found that “The usual practice of PSF units was to use excessive amounts of 
tear gas to disperse protesters.” BICI Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 1091.
121. “Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall…exercise 
restraint in such use” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 5(a). UN best practice also 
requires law enforcement agencies to restrain the application of means causing death or injury to persons. 
Id., at art. 2.
122. “Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall… act in 
proportion to the seriousness of the offense and legitimate objective to be achieved” Id., at art. 5(a).
123. “Law enforcement officials shall…minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life” Id., at art. 5(b).
124. “Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means 
before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain 
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.” Id., at art. 4. See also U.N. Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 3. 
125. By deploying toxic chemical agents preemptively, Bahraini police escalated violence that led to increased 
injuries. Such cases also show how less-lethal weapons can actually increase police violence, by lowering 
thresholds for deployment of force and starting a chain of escalating violence. As a result, training and 
oversight of police officials may be more significant overall in reducing injuries to police and civilians than 
use of less-lethal weapons. See Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Policy Statement on 
Less Lethal Weapons, 20 Feb. 2011, http://parliamentaryforum.org/sites/default/files/parlforum_policy_statement_
on_less_lethal_weapons_final.pdf; Amnesty International, Excessive and lethal force? Amnesty International’s 
concerns about deaths and ill-treatment involving police use of tasers (2004), http://educate-yourself.org/pnt/
amnestyintnl2004TASERfullreport.shtml. 
126. Before law enforcement officials resort to force, they must attempt to use non-violent means, such as 
physical presence, dialogue, communication of information, and de-escalation of conflict when dealing with 
peaceful assemblies. Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 9, DPKO Ref. 
2009.32 (effective 1 Mar. 2010).
127. These eyewitness accounts are corroborated by documentation by local human rights organizations. See 
Bahrain Center for Human Rights, February 14th: The Bahraini Authorities Brutally Suppress the Protests, 14 Feb. 
2012, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/5056. 
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17crowd with tear gas canisters, bird shot, and sound bombs. According to this eyewitness, the police 
made no attempt to communicate first with any of the protesters.128
This and 15 other eyewitness testimonies PHR received indicate that law enforcement officials 
routinely fail to warn civilians of their intent to use force,129 which contravenes UN guidelines.130 
Bahraini law enforcement officials use excessive and disproportionate force 
Bahraini riot police not only fail to exercise restraint when confronting demonstrators, they 
also overwhelm peaceful protesters with disproportionate force exceeding the “minimum ex-
tent necessary” to disperse unlawful assemblies.131 All 16 demonstrators whom PHR investi-
gators interviewed reported that law enforcement officials routinely fire inestimable numbers 
of grenades containing toxic chemical agents at civilians who demonstrate peacefully. 
A young man from Saar named Ali reported that immediately after a large number of riot police 
arrived at a nonviolent demonstration in his village on 28 January 2012, they shot volley after volley 
of tear gas canisters directly at the group of some 50 protesters. He heard the explosions come from 
behind. White low-hanging clouds of toxic smoke then appeared and were so thick he couldn’t see. 
Ali suddenly collapsed, blood streaming from his head where he had been hit by a canister. 132
The King of Bahrain’s own Commission of Inquiry found that “in the events of February/March 
2011 and subsequent events in many situations,”133 “[police] units resorted to the dispropor-
tionate use of tear gas for the dispersion of protesters. On many occasions, the number of tear 
gas canisters fired at protesters was disproportionate to the size of the demonstration and the 
number of participants.”134 
In using excessive amounts of toxic chemical agents against demonstrators, Bahraini law en-
forcement officials violate best practices, which dictate that any chemicals deployed should 
only contain the minimum that fulfills the purpose—“namely to minimize a person’s capac-
ity for resistance without unnecessarily prolonging their discomfort.”135 Those survivors of 
chemical agent attacks whom PHR interviewed reported debilitating short-term symptoma-
tology and long-term sequelae from exposure to toxic chemical agents. 
PHR met with former Miami (Florida, US) Chief of Police John Timoney,136 whom the Bahraini 
Ministry of Interior hired in December 2011 to advise law enforcement officials on crowd-
control tactics.137 Timoney has publicly defended the government’s use of toxic chemical 
128. Interview with key informant no. 73, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012).
129. Interview with key informant no. 18, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012). A local rights group reported that at one 
demonstration, Bahraini officials announced their intent to use force, but then attacked with toxic chemical 
agents only seconds later. See Josh Shahryar, Bahrain Interview: Nabeel Rajab-How Police Attacked the Manama 
March and Beat Me, EA World View, 8 Jan. 2011, http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2012/1/8/bahrain-
interview-nabeel-rajab-how-police-attacked-the-manam.html. 
130. “[L]aw enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use 
firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note 
 108, at art. 10. See also U.N. Policy on Formed Police Units, supra note 126, at 9.
131. “In the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the 
use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.” 
U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 13. The BICI also concluded that “PSF units used 
amounts of tear gas that were disproportionate to the objective of dispersing protesters.” BICI Report, supra 
note 20, at ¶ 1095.
132. Interview with key informant no. 08, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012).
133. BICI Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 1112 (2011).
134. Id., at ¶ 1117 (2011). 
135. Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, Guidance on the Use of Incapacitant 
Spray, art. 2.3.2, May 2009, http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2009/200905UNGIS01.pdf. 
136. Interview with key informant no. 95, in Bahrain (11 Apr. 2012). 
137. As a former Chief of Police in the United States, Timoney was known for using aggressive tactics to control 
crowds. Officers under Timoney in Miami used tasers, pepper spray, and batons against non-violent 
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18 agents “to create distance between gangs of rioters that have been … assaulting police 
officers with Molotov cocktails and also with bricks, nails, and other things.”138 This advisor 
stated that police are authorized to respond with force to defend themselves against imminent 
threat of death or serious injury,139 but Timoney did not acknowledge that such force must be 
tempered and directed proportionally140 at those who pose a grave threat.141 The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warns that when law enforcement officials resort to 
practices that extend beyond the powers and authorities granted to them by the law, the 
distinction between them and criminal offenders can no longer be made.142
One non-peaceful demonstrator whom PHR interviewed reported that riot police had first at-
tacked a group of peaceful demonstrators of which he was a part, before he attacked the riot 
police. Another eyewitness reported to PHR that he had burned the first and second digits of 
his right hand while attempting to throw back an exploded canister containing a toxic chemical 
agent that law enforcement officers had fired at him.143 The BICI did document times in which 
protesters have endangered law enforcement officials’ lives by throwing Molotov cocktails,144 
and no demonstrator has the right to attack law enforcement officials with incendiary devices. 
However, as previously noted, law enforcement officials must in response only deploy the 
minimal amount of force necessary to subdue or apprehend a violent protester. Such dispro-
portionate use of force excessively harms individuals and violates UN guidelines.145 
Bahraini law enforcement officials fail to minimize harm 
Failure to minimize damage and injury to demonstrators constitutes a third means by which 
Bahraini law enforcement officials deploy excessive force.146 Analysis of PHR findings shows 
that law enforcement officials who fired toxic chemical agents at assemblies without adhering 
to principles of proportionality and restraint caused unnecessary injury to civilians—demon-
strators and bystanders alike. 
PHR investigators interviewed 16 survivors who reported that Bahraini riot police fired canis-
ters containing toxic chemical agents directly at civilians, often aiming hand-held launchers at 
their targets’ upper bodies and heads.147 
protesters at the 2003 Free Trade Area of the Americas summit, resulting in 150 complaints of police abuse 
filed with the ACLU. Ryan Devereaux, John Timoney: the notorious police chief sent to reform forces in Bahrain, The 
Guardian, 16 Feb. 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/16/john-timoney-police-chief-bahrain-protests.
138. Voice of America, Bahrainis Complain of Government Tear Gas on Neighborhoods, 16 Feb. 2012, http://www.
voanews.com/content/bahrainis-complain-of-government-teargas-attacks-on-neighborhoods-139525848/152204.
html. 
139. “Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of 
others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly 
serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their 
authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these 
objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order 
to protect life.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 9.
140. “Proportional” refers to the seriousness of the offense and the legitimate objective to be achieved. Id., at art. 5(a).
141. Objectives must be “legitimate” and the use of force must be “proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.” Id.
142. ICRC, To Serve and To Protect: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security Forces 156 
(1998), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D308231847B7B08BC1256DBF00409023-
ICRC-toserveandtoprotect-feb98.pdf. 
143. Interview with key informant no. 18, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012). 
144. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry documented instances in which protesters threw rocks and 
Molotov cocktails at police. BICI Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 234, 258, 531. 
145. Recourse to potentially lethal force “may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” U.N. 
Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 9.
146. “Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall … [m]inimize 
damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life”. Id., at art. 5(b).
147. A U.N. human rights expert recently noted that “tear gas canisters should never be fired directly at 
demonstrators.” Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
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19One 20-year-old demonstrator told PHR that while he was attending a nonviolent rally, a policeman 
fired a tear gas canister at his head. He was immediately blinded and fell to the ground.148 PHR 
conducted a physical examination and reviewed this respondent’s medical records, which noted 
skull fractures and brain hemorrhaging.149
Another 15-year-old protester admitted that he had thrown small stones at a phalanx of riot police, 
saying he was “revenging all the people they have hurt.” In response, one official reportedly shot a 
canister containing a toxic chemical agent directly at this boy’s torso, severing a nerve in his upper 
right arm. Results from a physical examination PHR conducted revealed wounds highly consistent 
with the boy’s account, and review of his medical records corroborated his testimony.150
PHR further determined that Bahraini law enforcement officials failed to render aid and as-
sistance to wounded protesters—as international guidelines require151—thus exacerbating 
injuries. Among 14 wounded demonstrators whom PHR investigators interviewed, none re-
ported that law enforcement officials had come to their aid to render assistance, even when 
they were in need of emergency medical care. In fact, some demonstrators reported that 
Bahraini police fired on them and then proceeded to beat them after they had already been 
incapacitated. 
PHR interviewed a young teenage boy who reported that he had been knocked unconscious after 
police fired a tear gas canister at his head. The boy’s family reported that police then surrounded 
him and kicked him while he lay unconscious and bleeding from an open head wound.152
During a demonstration of 20-30 people who were protesting police use of force at a funeral for a 
wounded demonstrator earlier that morning, some 20 riot police stormed them and aimed their tear 
gas launchers153 at the demonstrators, according to a teenage boy who had attended. He reported 
that one policeman fired a canister directly at his head, severely injuring his left eye. The boy 
collapsed on the ground and said that several police then ran over and began to kick him and beat 
him with batons while he lay bloodied on the street.154 
Another means by which Bahraini law enforcement officials fail to minimize harm is by not al-
lowing or providing clear and obvious corridors of escape when using toxic chemical agents 
for crowd dispersal.155 The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) documented 
this pattern by which police routinely blocked entrances to villages where protests took place, 
in order to prevent demonstrators from escaping once they began firing toxic chemical agents 
opinion and expression at the conclusion of his visit to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory (18 Dec. 2011), 
available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/67C53F54894114298525796C0056DED2.
148. Interview with key informant no. 73, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012). 
149. The medical record noted “depressed fracture of left frontal bone and cerebral hemorrhagic contusion 
underneath with edema.” PHR’s physical exam revealed a 2.75-cm sutured laceration just inside the hairline 
in the left temporal region, ending in a circular, depressed region.
150. Interview with key informant no. 64, in Bahrain (7 Apr. 2012).
151. “Law enforcement officials must … ensure assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected 
persons at the earliest possible moment” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 5(c).
152. Interview with key informant no. 63, in Bahrain (7 Apr. 2012). 
153. Toxic chemical agent launchers, sometimes referred to as gas guns or riot guns, are weapons designed to fire 
canisters or other projectiles containing toxic chemical agents as munitions. Some launchers can shoot toxic 
chemical agent munitions a distance of about 65-90 meters. USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 
Nonlethal Weapons: Terms and References, INSS Occasional Paper 15, 27 (1996), http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/
OCP/ocp15.pdf; U.S Department of Justice, Technology Assessment Program: Barrier-Penetrating Tear Gas 
Munitions 3.10 (1985), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/099857.pdf.
154. Interview with key informant no. 87, in Bahrain (10 Apr. 2012).
155. “Where it is necessary to disperse a crowd, always leave a clear and obvious corridor of escape.” U.N. 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and Law Enforcement: A Trainer’s Guide 
on Human Rights for the Police, Professional Training Series No. 5/Add.2, 114 (2002), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/training5Add2en.pdf.
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156 At no point should law enforcement officials corner crowds to create a 
perception of no escape, because this can escalate violence and maximize harm.157
Toxic chemical agent attacks endanger the health of bystanders and protesters
PHR examined civilians who reported being injured by Bahraini law enforcement officials while 
exercising their right to freedom of assembly. Injured protesters whom PHR investigators ex-
amined suffered from (1) blunt force trauma and lacerations to the head, torso, and limbs due 
to the impact of metal toxic chemical agent canisters being fired at them; and (2) toxic reaction 
to exposure to chemical agents such as burning of the eyes, nose, and throat, chest tightness, 
shortness of breath, vomiting, and skin burns. In addition, a number of people have reportedly 
died from toxic chemical agent exposure in Bahrain, according to the United Nations.158
Blunt force trauma and lacerations. Law enforcement officials cause severe blunt force trau-
ma to civilians when they fire toxic chemical agent canisters directly at individuals at close 
range.159 Police hit one 27-year-old bystander in the head with a canister while he was walking 
near the site of a protest in Karanah, causing a fractured skull and intracranial hemorrhag-
ing.160 
“You’re lucky to have survived,” the doctor who performed this CT scan told this victim, “Others from 
the same injury have died.”161 PHR investigators examined the CT scan, which corroborated this 
victim’s testimony. 
PHR spoke with another bystander, a 13-year-old named Hadi, whom riot police struck in the 
head with a toxic chemical agent canister as he waited in line at a bakery near the site of an 
ongoing protest. 
Hadi reported that he turned to look over his shoulder after hearing a commotion behind him, and 
saw a group of 20 people run past him trailed by about 50 policemen dressed in blue uniforms and 
carrying black “safety” equipment.162 Just moments later, an officer standing approximately 15 
meters away shot a tear gas canister at Hadi’s head, knocking him unconscious. PHR examined Hadi 
and documented a seven-centimeter healed laceration at the hairline of his right forehead as well 
as a circular depression in his skull roughly five centimeters in diameter, where an arterial pulse 
was clearly visible and the underlying soft tissue easily palpated. His wound was highly consistent 
with being struck by a cylinder-shaped object.
Peaceful demonstrators also received facial wounds when police launched toxic chemical 
agent canisters at heads. 
When police reportedly shot a tear gas canister at Ali’s head,163 they hit him in the left eye, fracturing 
the bones around his eye and rupturing his eyeball. Doctors at Salmaniya Hospital performed two 
operations, one to stitch his open wounds and one to repair the broken bones around his eye socket.  
 
 
156. BICI Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 1091.
157. U.S. Army, Civil Disturbance Operations, 2-90 (2005), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-19-15.pdf. 
158. U.N. News Centre, Bahrain: UN calls for probe into alleged excessive use of force against protesters, 20 Mar. 
2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41586&Cr=Bahrain&Cr1. 
159. “Ballistic studies have shown that the gas jet alone generated by a commercial available blank or tear-gas 
cartridge possess the characteristics of a missile when fired at close range…” Lethal head injury due to tear-
gas cartridge gunshots, supra note 80, at 45-51. Recently, Bahraini law enforcement officials injured prominent 
human rights activist Zainab al-Khawaja by shooting her in the leg with a toxic chemical agent canister “at 
close range.” Reem Khalifa, Bahrain witnesses: Activist hurt by gas canister, 28 Jun. 2012, AP, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10311414. 
160. Interview with key informant no. 25, in Bahrain (10 Apr. 2012).
161. Id.
162. Interview with key informant no. 63, in Bahrain (7 Apr. 2012). 
163. Interview with key informant no. 87, in Bahrain (10 Apr. 2012).
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21Ali reported that he has permanently lost use of his left eye. PHR examined Ali’s medical records, 
which corroborate his testimony.164
Symptomatology of exposure to toxic chemical agents. In addition to wounds due to the impact 
of toxic chemical agent canisters, PHR investigators also documented severe tearing, burn-
ing eyes, throat irritation, chest tightness, shortness of breath, and vomiting in individuals 
exposed to toxic chemical agents.165 Because chemicals in toxic lachrymatory agents can 
destroy membranes of the throat, esophagus, and mouth, such vomiting can become danger-
ous.166 Even if an exposed person quickly leaves the chemical-saturated area, symptoms of 
exposure can last hours.167 It has been shown that hyperventilation, often induced by running, 
intensifies the effects of toxic chemical agents on the throat and lungs and slows recovery.168 
Sustained exposure to toxic chemical agents can also burn skin and the cornea of the eye.169
A physiotherapist reported that she developed shortness of breath, wheezing and severe coughing, 
turned red, and felt hot after being exposed to tear gas that was yellow in color. A doctor at private 
hospital treated her with Atrovent170 and Symbicort171, but she reported having continued difficulty 
breathing at night and difficulty speaking for approximately two weeks.172 
PHR investigators received eyewitness reports that Bahraini police used toxic chemical 
agents of different colors, ranging from white and yellowish-beige to various shades of dark 
yellow and orange as well as blue. Local physicians and wounded demonstrators told PHR 
that symptoms varied based on the color of the gas, with some the lighter-colored gases pro-
voking more tearing and skin irritation, while the dark yellow gas reportedly provoked little 
tearing but more severe symptoms, including chest tightness and coughing, nausea and vom-
iting, and loss of consciousness.173
The cases in the above sections illustrate gradations of harm that result from Bahraini law 
enforcement officials’ excessive use of force. Failing to exercise restraint before resorting to 
violence, responding to demonstrators with disproportionate force, and failing to minimize 
harm have led to grave injuries among men, women, and children in Bahrain. These actions 
contravene established UN principles and international norms that the Bahraini government 
must uphold.
164. Ali’s medical records revealed the “upper and lower lids were shattered with full thickness multiple wounds. 
The left eye ball was ruptured. The globe was soft and exposed.” A CT scan revealed a fracture of the 
zygomatic arch with minimal displacement, fracture of all the walls of the maxillary sinus with haemosinus, 
and a 5 mm subdural hematoma in the left upper parietal region.
165. These symptoms are all recognized effects of toxic lachrymatory agent exposure. See Handbook of Chemical 
and Biological Warfare Agents, supra note 110, at 409. Dr. Holly Atkinson, author of this report suffered acute 
respiratory distress—including profound shortness of breath as well as severe coughing, which persisted 
intermittently for approximately four weeks—after 15 minutes’ exposure to toxic chemical agents during a 
protest in Bahrain in April 2012.
166. CAMEO Chemicals, Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
Chemical Datasheet: O-Chlorobenzlyidene Malononitrile, http://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/19984.
167. Medical Hazards of the Tear Gas CS, supra note 105, at 236. 
168. Exposures to orthochlorobenzylidene malononitrile, supra note 117, at 366-74.
169. Medical Hazards of the Tear Gas CS, supra note 105, at 234-40. 
170. Atrovent, also known as Ipratropium, is a drug that helps to preventing wheezing and decrease chest 
tightness. US National Library of Medicine, Ipratropium Oral Inhalation, PubMed Health, 1 Sep. 2010, http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0000965/.
171. Symbicort is a drug used to decrease inflation of the lungs, and is primarily used to control asthma. Food and 
Drug Administration. Medication Guide Symbicort, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm089139.pdf 
(last visited 29 Jun. 2012).
172. Interview with key informant no. 74, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
173. Interviews with key informants no. 66, 67, 68, 74, 87 in Bahrain (7-10 Apr. 2012). 
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Both national174 and international175 law ensure the right to peaceful assembly, and govern-
ment authorities may only restrict this fundamental right in the interest of national security 
or public order.176 Although governments may limit this derogable right in accordance with 
national law and international obligations, they must adhere to rules and standards when 
dispersing crowds.177 The United Nations has established principles for such use of force,178 
which must always be based on legality,179 necessity,180 proportionality,181 minimizing harm,182 
and nondiscrimination.183 Moreover, law enforcement officials who violate these principles 
must be held accountable.184
Legality. Law enforcement officials are obliged to fulfill their duties to uphold the law and 
protect citizens.185 Bahrain’s Constitution permits civilians to hold peaceful meetings, gather-
ings, and processions, which law enforcement officials are obliged to permit and protect.186 
According to Bahrain’s penal code, when groups of five or more persons assemble—specifi-
cally with the intent to cause a riot—law enforcement officials may disperse them.187 
174. “Public meetings, parades, and assemblies are permitted under the rules and conditions laid down by law, 
but the purposes and the purposes and the means of the meeting must be peaceful” Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, supra note 13, at art. 28(b). 
175. “The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
21, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (acceded 20 Sep. 2006) [hereinafter ICCPR].
176. “No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the 
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order … protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
Id., at art. 21. 
177. “Governments and law enforcement agencies shall adopt and implement rules and regulations on the use of 
force and firearms against persons by law enforcement officials.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra 
note  108, at art. 1. See also U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 1. 
178. PHR adopts its definition of “use of force” from the International Association of Chiefs of Police and U.S. 
Department of Justice, as the “amount of effort required by law enforcement to compel compliance by an 
unwilling subject.” US Department of Justice, Review of the Department of Justice’s Use of Less-Lethal 
Weapons i (2009), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0903/final.pdf. 
179. “Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed upon them by law, by serving the 
community and by protecting all persons … consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their 
profession.” U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 1.
180. “Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means 
before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain 
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra 
note  108, at art. 4. See also U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 3, which 
states, “Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for 
the performance of their duty.”
181. “Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall: (a) Exercise 
restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense and legitimate objective to be 
achieved”. U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 5(a). See also U.N. Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 3.
182. “[L]aw enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human 
rights of all persons.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 3. See also U.N. Code of 
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 2.
183. “In time of public emergency … the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating 
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international 
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.” 
[emphasis added] ICCPR supra note 175, at art. 4(1).
184. “Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials is 
punished as a criminal offence under their law.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 7.
185. “Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed upon them by law, by serving the 
community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility 
required by their profession.” U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 1. 
186. “Public meetings, parades and assemblies are permitted under the rules and conditions laid down by law, 
but the purposes and means of the meeting must be peaceful and must not be prejudicial to public decency.” 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, supra note 13, at art. 28(b). 
187. “If one of the public authority officers finds that 5 persons or more have demonstrated with the intent of 
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23Necessity. Before using force, law enforcement officials must exercise restraint and always 
begin with nonviolent means when confronting assemblies.188 Dialogue and mediation must 
first be employed.189 Police should also respond to protesters nonviolently by wearing defen-
sive vests and helmets and by using shields and nonlethal instruments, thus decreasing the 
need to use weapons of any kind.190 Law enforcement officials should plan in advance for the 
progressive use of force and avoid unnecessary escalation of violence.191 Before employing 
force, police must warn civilians of their intent to use force, and then make every effort to de-
termine that demonstrators have heard and understood these warnings.192 
Proportionality. Law enforcement officials are obligated to use the minimum level of force 
necessary to disperse a crowd.193 When law enforcement officials are faced with serious 
threats, they may employ less-lethal weaponry.194 Police may only use such weapons, howev-
er, if the use of force is preceded by (a) nonviolent tactics, (b) clear warnings that officials in-
tend to use force, and (c) efforts to determine that demonstrators have heard and understood 
these warnings.195 Only when a situation has escalated to present an imminent deadly threat 
should law enforcement officials apply proportional and reasonable use of lethal force.196 
causing a riot, he may in such capacity order them to disperse. Thereafter, he shall be empowered to take the 
necessary measures for dispersing those who have not complied with the order by arresting them and may 
use force within reasonable limits against any person resisting the said order. He may not use firearms except 
in extreme necessity or when someone’s life is threatened.” Bahrain Penal Code, art. 180, 1976, available at 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=6361. 
188. “Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before 
resorting to the use of force and firearms.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 4.
189. Governments must also provide law enforcement officials training, while giving “special attention to issues 
of police ethics and human rights, …to alternatives to the use of force and firearms, including the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts, the understanding of crowd behavior, and the methods of persuasion, negotiation 
and mediation … with a view to limiting the use of force and firearms.” Id., at art. 20. See also U.N. Policy on 
Formed Police Units, supra note 126, at 9.
190. “Governments and law enforcement agencies should … be equipped with self-defensive equipment such 
as shields, helmets, bullet-proof vests and bullet-proof means of transportation, in order to decrease the 
need to use weapons of any kind.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 2. See also U.N. 
Trainer’s Guide on Human Rights for the Police, supra note 155, at 96, 114.
191. “Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip 
law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated 
use of force and firearms. These should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for 
use in appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application of means capable of 
causing death or injury to persons.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 2. See also U.N. 
Trainer’s Guide on Human Rights for the Police, supra note 155, at 96, 114. 
192. “[L]aw enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use 
firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, unless to do so would unduly place the law 
enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons, or would be 
clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances of the incident.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, 
supra note  108, at art. 10. See also U.N. Policy on Formed Police Units, supra note 126, at 9.
193. “Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means 
before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain 
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra 
note  108, at art. 4.
194. “The development and deployment of non-lethal incapacitating weapons should be carefully evaluated 
in order to minimize the risk of endangering uninvolved persons, and the use of such weapons should be 
carefully controlled.” Id., at art. 3. See also the U.N. Formed Police Units approach to addressing escalating 
threat levels, which states that at a “Serious” threat level law enforcement may use a“[s]how of force and, 
where all other means of peaceful de-escalation have failed, use of force in a reasonable and proportional 
manner, using only less-lethal means and weapons”. U.N. Policy on Formed Police Units, supra note 126, at 9.
195. “Law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use 
firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed”. U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note 
108, at art. 10 . See also Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 9, DPKO 
Ref. 2009.32 (effective 1 Mar. 2010); U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note 108, at art. 10.
196. “Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others 
against the imminent threat of death or serious injury” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at 
art. 9. See also U.N. Policy on Formed Police Units, supra note 126, at 9.
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24 Minimizing harm. When police do resort to the use of force to disperse demonstrators, UN 
guidelines require that they minimize damage and injury, respect and preserve human life, 
ensure that assistance and medical aid reach affected persons at the earliest possible mo-
ment, and make sure that friends and relatives of the injured are notified.197 
Nondiscrimination. The principle of nondiscrimination is fundamental to all human rights. 
When a government declares a state of emergency (as did Bahrain from 15 March to 1 June 
2011), it may limit citizens’ right of assembly. In doing so, however, the government may not 
discriminate on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.198 
Accountability. The Government of Bahrain must hold law enforcement officials accountable 
under its penal code, which codifies these international principles.199 Bahrain’s penal code 
mandates jail time for any law enforcement official who infringes on a person’s freedom by 
using force or threat, or causes severe bodily harm.200 UN principles also indicate that the 
arbitrary or abusive use of force should be punished as a criminal offense.201 According to 
UN guidelines, law enforcement officials are obliged to report any civilian injuries or deaths 
promptly to their superiors.202 Superior officers are then obliged to report these incidents to 
the proper administrative and judicial authorities.203 These authorities must hold command-
ing officers responsible when they fail to suppress unlawful use of force among police they 
supervise,204 and any civilian affected by unlawful use of police force must have access to 
independent, judicial review.205 Finally, under the UN guidelines, no law enforcement official 
should be disciplined for refusing an order to use excessive force.206 The guidelines state that 
the Bahraini government should not invoke exceptional circumstances, including political in-
stability or public emergency, to justify any departure from these principles.207
197. “Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall … ensure that 
relatives or close friends of the injured or affected person are notified at the earliest possible moment.” U.N. 
Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 5(d). 
198. ICCPR supra note 175, at art. 4(1).
199. “Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials is 
punished as a criminal offence under their law.” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 7.
200. “A prison sentence shall be the penalty for any person who … deprives [another] in any illegal manner of his 
freedom … [i]f the act is accompanied by … bodily harm or acts of physical or mental torture.” Bahrain Penal 
Code, supra note 187, at art. 357.
201. “U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 7.
202. “Where injury or death is caused by the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, they shall 
report the incident promptly to their superiors” U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 6.
203. “In cases of death and serious injury or other grave consequences, a detailed report shall be sent promptly to 
the competent authorities responsible for administrative review and judicial control.” Id., at art. 22.
204. “Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are held responsible if they 
know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials under their command are resorting, or have 
resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and they did not take all measures in their power to 
prevent, suppress or report such use.” Id., at art. 24.
205. “Persons affected by the use of force and firearms or their legal representatives shall have access to an 
independent process, including a judicial process.” Id., at art. 23.
206. “Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that no criminal or disciplinary sanction is 
imposed on law enforcement officials who, in compliance with the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials and these basic principles, refuse to carry out an order to use force and firearms, or who report such 
use by other officials.” Id., at art. 25; “Obedience to superior orders shall be no defence if law enforcement 
officials knew that an order to use force and firearms resulting in the death or serious injury of a person was 
manifestly unlawful and had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow it. In any case, responsibility also 
rests on the superiors who gave the unlawful orders.” Id., at art. 26.
207. “Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be 
invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles.” Id., at art. 8.
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25Bahraini government violates human rights law by 
weaponizing toxic chemical agents
Analysis from PHR’s April 2012 investigation in Bahrain reveals that Bahraini law enforcement 
officials routinely attack civilians inside their homes with toxic gas. The frequency of the rou-
tine attacks on civilians as well as the lack of accountability for officials who commit such at-
tacks implies intent on the part of law enforcement to use toxic chemical agents as a weapon 
against peaceful civilians. Such unprovoked and flagrant attacks against families—who pose 
no threat to the safety of others—flout international human rights law. Specifically, Bahraini 
law enforcement officials 
(1) subject men, women, and children, including vulnerable disabled and elderly persons, 
to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; 
(2) unlawfully enter families’ homes and destroy property; 
(3) intentionally committed acts that impair people’s health; and 
(4) discriminate against one religious sect by targeting Shi’a neighborhoods. 
Based on in-country research, PHR warns that the ongoing 18-month siege and targeted use 
of toxic gas against a civilian population have caused inestimable physical harm and will con-
tinue to inflict as yet unknown negative health effects among this population.
Bahraini law enforcement officials attack civilians inside their homes and 
destroy property
Based on key informant interviews and firsthand observations, Physicians for Human Rights 
determined that Bahraini law enforcement officials continue to launch unprovoked toxic 
chemical agent attacks against nonviolent Shi’a men, women, and children, including the el-
derly and disabled in their homes and cars. 
A Bahraini woman shouts at riot police firing tear gas Saturday, April 7, 2012, in the market area of downtown Manama 
Photo: AP Photo/Hasan Jamali
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26 Two sisters from Shela told PHR investigators that police shot tear gas canisters directly into their 
home on five separate occasions.208 On the second occasion, they reported police ripped protective 
covers off of the family’s air conditioners and pulled sealant away from the windows from the 
outside, before throwing tear gas canisters through a window and yelling, “If you want freedom, 
come out to us.”209 They reported that in the third incident, police broke through the front door and 
threw a tear gas canister into their home. They do not know why they were targeted. 
PHR investigators also interviewed several members of a large family—ages 3 to 65—who 
were forced from their home after police stormed their home, attempted to abduct a 15-year-
old boy, and fired canisters containing toxic chemical agents into the house causing a 14-year-
old girl to fall unconscious. Law enforcement officials then reportedly surrounded the exits, 
inhibiting escape. 
Family members reported that friends and extended family had gathered in their home on 5 
April 2012 around 10:00 p.m.210 The grandfather stepped outside to investigate a commotion, as 
a demonstration was taking place in their village that evening, and the family had taken in some 
peaceful demonstrators who had fled. The elderly man noticed that a man outside wearing civilian 
clothes put on a mask to cover his face. He reported that the masked man turned suddenly and ran 
toward him, barging past him through the front door into the foyer of his home, where a boy aged 
15 was standing. The masked man reportedly started to drag the teenager out of the house, when 
several older men in the living room jumped up to come to the teenager’s rescue. They pulled the 
boy back into the house and slammed the front door. The masked man began banging and kicking 
the door, and then reportedly shot a tear gas canister through the kitchen window just to the left of 
the door. As one woman of the house related, “We heard the shatter of the glass in the kitchen, but 
didn’t realize there was a tear gas bomb in the house.” 
Family members reported to PHR that when the first floor of the house became engulfed in a cloud 
of toxic gas, a second tear gas canister exploded in the living room. Family members scrambled to 
a “safe room” in the house, which they had constructed due to ongoing toxic chemical agent attacks 
in their village, but mounting tear gas levels prevented them from staying inside. Family members 
testified that they then realized police had encircled the house, shooting tear gas canisters through 
windows into the kitchen, living room, a back storage room, and the “safe room” while blocking 
doors and escape routes. “The entire house was 
overwhelmed with clouds of tear gas,” one family 
member told PHR. One young boy jumped from 
a staircase landing window above the front door, 
while other family members carried outside a 
14-year-old girl who had fallen unconscious. 
Eventually, everyone in the house managed to 
escape and sought refuge nearby. A neighbor 
reportedly told the family later that the police 
forces shooting tear gas canisters were overheard 
saying, “Just shoot them with a shotgun.” 
The PHR team inspected this house—still vacated 
at the time—four days after the incident occurred. 
PHR investigators found toxic chemical agent 
canisters on the roof and inside the home on the 
first floor. Windows were broken throughout the 
house. Despite the open windows, toxic fumes 
from the chemical agents remained inside  
 
208. Interviews with key informants no. 68, 69, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012).
209. Id.
210. Interviews with key informants no. 70, 71, 72 in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012). 
This image by twitter user @ElaineMasons shows tear gas smoke coming 
from a canister shot on the top of a house in Buri village, Bahrain,  
6 January 2012.
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27the  home. Upon entering the home, both PHR investigators developed burning of the face and eyes, 
tearing, coughing, and headaches within about two minutes of exposure. 
Highlighting the frequency with which many Bahraini families are exposed to harassing 
agents in residential areas, PHR investigators visited one home in which residents provided 
“guest gas masks” to visitors exposed to toxic chemical agents in and around the home. 
“We’ve been exposed to tear gases almost every day,” said one resident of a Shi’a neighborhood. 
“We’ve had canisters shot in the house, on the doorstep, and on the roof. We’ve had so many attacks, 
I can’t count the number of times. You don’t need to go outside to smell the ‘tear gas.’”
PHR documented the presence of hundreds of toxic chemical agent canisters in Shi’a villages 
and in people’s homes. Bahraini law enforcement officials are also frequently seen on video211 
firing chemical agents into homes. 
Bahraini law enforcement officials launch toxic chemical agents at civilian 
vehicles
In addition to targeting civilians in their homes, law enforcement officials also launch toxic 
chemical agent canisters as weapons at civilians in their vehicles. PHR interviewed civilians 
who posed no imminent threat to police or public safety while in their cars, but who were 
nonetheless targeted by police. 
PHR spoke with Mohammad, a 32-year-old man whom police reportedly attacked with tear gas while 
in his car. Mohammad reported that while he was driving near the site of a protest, police shot a tear 
gas canister straight through his car window, which hit Mohammad in the head. Two more tear gas 
canisters were then fired into the back of his car. Mohammad reported that tear gas filled his vehicle 
and within 30 seconds, he had blurred vision and began vomiting. Mohammad kept driving while 
sticking his head out the window until a group of local residents pulled Mohammad out of the car. 
They took him immediately to a private hospital where a doctor stitched Mohammad’s wounds. 
PHR examined Mohammad and confirmed the presence of a healed laceration approximately two 
centimeters long at the hairline above the left temple, corroborating his testimony. 212
Another interviewee reported that police officers had fired toxic chemical agent canisters at 
his car as he fled a peaceful protest that he had helped organize. 
Abdullah reported that between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. on 13 February 2012, he was alone in his vehicle 
when police fired tear gas at his car from a bridge over Budaiya Highway. Abdullah saw white smoke 
enter the car through the vents. He immediately had difficulty breathing, and his eyes and nose 
began to burn. With the windows rolled down, Abdullah managed to stay in his car for approximately 
two minutes while driving to safety, before he escaped from the car.213 
The blatant misuse of toxic chemical agents, the frequency with which weaponized toxic 
chemical agent attacks occur, the targeted nature of the attacks, and the lack of solid ac-
countability mechanisms for perpetrators of these attacks imply intentionality on the part of 
Bahraini law enforcement. The intentional infliction of such targeted violence on Shi’a indi-
viduals and families results in adverse health effects. Because toxic chemical agents become 
211. For clear examples of an apparent police officer firing chemical agents into a home unprovoked on a peaceful 
street, see France 24, Bahraini police caught on camera spraying tear gas into homes, 5 Jun. 2012, http://observers.
france24.com/content/20120605-bahraini-police-caught-camera-spraying-tear-gas-homes-protest-deaths-video 
and YouTube, How the Bahraini citizen suffocated from tear gas in his house, 15 Jul. 2011, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ygp6id7xvk8. For an example of an apparent police officer firing chemical agents into a car seemingly 
unprovoked, forcing a mother to pull her child hurriedly from the contaminated back seat, see YouTube, The 
Bahraini anti-riot police throw tear gas on a child, 7 Aug. 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zBEcmA5nI7Y. 
212. Interview with key informant no. 78, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
213. Interview with key informant no. 20, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
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28 even more dangerous weapons when used in confined spaces,
214 the Bahraini government has 
threatened individuals’ safety and even their lives with their misuse of toxic chemical agents. 
Bahrain’s misuse of toxic chemical agents causes severe and long-term  
pain and suffering 
Bahraini law enforcement officials’ persistent targeting civilians in enclosed spaces may lead to 
serious long-term health consequences including (1) miscarriages (clinical spontaneous abor-
tions), (2) severe respiratory distress resulting in premature death, and (3) a projected rise in 
asthma among the population.215 In confined or enclosed spaces, high concentrations of chemi-
cal agents are hazardous and can be lethal.216 Scientific literature also suggests that some toxic 
lachrymatory agents may be responsible for genetic mutations and possibly deformities.217
Miscarriage. PHR investigators interviewed seven women—from villages that have been re-
peatedly exposed to toxic chemical agents—who reported having had miscarriages, six of 
them during their first trimester. All seven women reported they had miscarried just weeks 
after heavy exposure to toxic chemical agents in and around their homes. PHR investigators 
were able to examine five of the seven women’s sonograms and medical records, which cor-
roborated their testimonies. Two of the women were not able to procure their medical re-
cords.
Local medical professionals also reported to PHR that they had begun to associate miscar-
riage with women’s exposure to toxic chemical agents.218 One obstetrician/gynecologist said 
that she had seen an increase in miscarriages—especially in the first trimester—in her 
practice at a private hospital in a predominately Shi’a community exposed to toxic chemical 
agents.219 Two other female physicians, who live in neighborhoods regularly saturated with 
toxic chemical agents, also reported an increase in miscarriages among their patients; one 
physician exposed to toxic chemical agents reported she herself had recently developed ab-
normal menstrual periods and suspected a miscarriage.220 
A nurse who works at Salmaniya Hospital told PHR investigators, “There are many, many 
miscarriages. We believe the miscarriage rate has increased, although there is no quantitative 
evidence. What I want to know is: What is this gas...and what will be the future complications?221
214. Scientists can project concentrations of chemical lachrymatory agents that would be deadly for 50% 
of healthy adults, and have determined that the center of gas cloud after a single grenade explosion is 
approximately one fifth of that number. When toxic chemical agents are detonated in an enclosed space or 
in a cluster of several canisters, the concentration of toxins would be much higher. Chemical Warfare Agents: 
Chemistry, Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutics, supra note 47, at 361. Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic 
Chemical Weapon?, supra note 37, at 661.
215. “The possibility of long-term health consequences such as tumor formation, reproductive effects, and 
pulmonary disease is especially disturbing in view of the multiple exposures sustained by demonstrators 
and non-demonstrators alike in some areas of civilian unrest.” Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical 
Weapon?, supra note 37, at 662. Hu et al. also reported that in situations of high levels of CS exposure, heart 
failure, liver damage and death have occurred in adults. In animal studies, lung injury is the primary cause 
of death in subjects exposed to prolonged inhalation of CS. Histologic findings included “pulmonary vascular 
congestion, accompanied in severe cases by focal hemorrhages and edema.” Id.
216. Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, supra note 110, at 403. 
217. “[CS gas] is potentially genotoxic… Some researchers have shown CS to be mutogenic.… Little is known 
regarding its potential for chronic pulmonary or genotoxic effects or for potential effects on reproduction.” 
Tear Gas – Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, supra note 37, at 662.
218. For additional information indicating that exposure to toxic chemical agents may correlate with increased rates 
of stillbirth and miscarriage, see Physicians for Human Rights, The Casualties of Conflict, supra note 64, at 19.
219. Interview with key informant no. 84, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
220. Interview with key informant no. 83, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
221. Interview with key informant no. 67, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012). 
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29Three of the seven women who had miscarriages told PHR that their doctors had asked them 
in which villages they lived immediately after informing them that their fetuses were not vi-
able. All of the doctors communicated to these women that they had recently seen more mis-
carriages among women living in areas heavily exposed to tear gas compared with women 
living in neighborhoods not repeatedly exposed to the toxic chemical agent. One woman from 
Sitra222 who miscarried during her 11th week of pregnancy223 reported that the first question 
her doctor had asked her, after finding that her baby had no heartbeat, was whether there 
were problems related to “political unrest” in her village. Presumably, this doctor knew that 
political unrest in a village implied that toxic chemical agents would be omnipresent. 
One woman questioned whether her exposure to tear gas was responsible for deformities of her fetus 
when she miscarried. The young woman from Sitra, who miscarried during her 12th week of pregnancy, 
told PHR that her fetus had deformities of the head and neck. She reported having no history of previous 
miscarriages, difficulties becoming pregnant, or history of familial genetic disorders.224
Another woman told PHR that when she first discovered she was pregnant, she tried to use a gas 
mask while at home as she was concerned about the health of her unborn child. She said that using 
a gas mask proved impossible to do, however, given the need to communicate with her three young 
children. She miscarried in her seventh week of pregnancy.225
A young woman interviewed by PHR reported that “many Bahraini women are suffering from the 
psychological effects of losing a baby and extreme fear. They are not able to speak out and they 
lack their medical records. The hospitals are not giving us the medical records to document the 
miscarriages and the birth defects that are happening, so I must speak out.”226
Respiratory failure and death. PHR spoke with two families who had family members who al-
legedly died from complications related to toxic chemical agent exposure. In both cases, de-
ceased individuals were only exposed to toxic chemical agents in the privacy of their homes, 
and died despite treatment in the hospital. 
Two sisters from Shela, for example, told PHR investigators how their father had died at age 55 
following nearly daily exposure to tear gas in his home. The sisters explained that each time their 
father–who had a heart condition–was exposed to “tear gas,” he developed shortness of breath, 
turned reddish-purple, became dizzy, and at times became confused and disoriented. With each 
passing episode he became worse, they reported. On one occasion, police reportedly “bombarded” 
their house with tear gas canisters, shooting them into the house, onto the roof, and in the streets 
outside. After their father developed severe symptoms and said, “I feel like I’m going to die,” they 
carried him across the road and took him to Salmaniya Hospital. Their father died the following 
day. While the doctor reportedly told the sisters that their father had died from “breathing gas,” the 
death certificate attributes death to “septic shock and severe right-sided pneumonia.”227
Bahraini law228 requires medical workers to report wounded protesters to the very law 
enforcement officials who have harmed them, thereby creating a conflict of dual loyalty 
wherein health professionals have competing obligations to their patients and the government. 
222. Sitra is a predominantly Shi’a neighborhood that is routinely saturated with toxic chemical agents. 
223. Interview with key informant no. 75, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
224. Interview with key informant no. 76, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
225. Interview with key informant no. 77, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
226. Interview with key informant no. 79, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
227. This individual was reportedly known to have had a heart condition and had previously had a “small stroke,” 
according to his daughters. 
228. Bahrain’s Ministry of Health issued a “circular” to all private hospitals and clinics, according to a focus group 
of eight physicians PHR surveyed. This 31 January 2012 Government circular stated that private hospitals 
and clinics were now obligated to report to Government security authorities all incoming patients “with 
injuries due to suspected criminal activities and/or accidents irrespective [of] their causes.... Violation 
of these requirements shall constitute collaboration with such activities and is criminalized by law.” See 
Physicians for Human Rights, Under the Gun: Ongoing Assaults on Bahrain’s Health System 4 (2012), http://
physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/under-the-gun-ongoing-assaults-on-bahrains-health-system.html 
W e a ponizing Te a r gas
30 As the above case illustrates, medical personnel are extremely reluctant to document their 
patients’ reported exposure to tear gas.229 As one doctor told PHR, he purposely omits writing 
in the medical record the patient’s history, cause of injury, or any other information related to 
excessive use of force by Bahraini law enforcement officials, to protect these patients and their 
families.230
PHR also met with relatives of Muhammad, a young asthmatic man from a Shi’a village, who 
died of acute respiratory failure following 25 days of hospitalization after exposure to toxic 
chemical agents. 
Muhammad’s family reported that he was routinely exposed to tear gas and sought medical care 
in private hospitals, but never told doctors about his severe adverse reactions to the gas for fear of 
being reported to authorities and sent to prison.231 Family members reported that police had fired 
tear gas canisters into their village, and particularly around their home, on an almost daily basis. 
On the day of his death, Muhammad left the hospital (where he had been treated for respiratory 
problems due to tear gas exposure) to visit his family, when he was exposed to yet another tear 
gas explosion in his village. That evening, he reportedly developed severe shortness of breath 
and returned to the hospital where he went into respiratory failure.232 Medics administered CPR, 
but failed to resuscitate him. Muhammad’s doctor reported to PHR investigators that his death 
certificate stated he died of cardiac arrest, secondary to severe pulmonary hypertension caused by 
“mediastinal mass.”233 The doctor then told investigators, “There was no indication in his chart that 
he had a mass, nor were there any studies to substantiate it. He was cyanosed and died of an acute 
respiratory failure.”
Asthma. Demonstrators as well as civilians who never participated in protests reported 
to PHR that they suffered from new symptoms, including persistent coughing, shortness 
of breath, chest tightness, and wheezing,234 all of which may indicate onset of asthma.235 
Respondents told PHR investigators that they believed their ongoing respiratory distress was 
due to chronic contact with tear gas that they could not escape;236 others reported that symp-
toms continued long after exposure.237
A specialist physician working with Bahrain’s Ministry of Health reported to PHR that the most 
common medical complications he currently treats relate to inhalation problems.238 He reported 
to PHR that he had recently seen a dramatic rise in asthma-like symptoms affecting people of all 
ages in Bahrain. Patients exhibiting respiratory distress, he reported, have not necessarily been 
involved in protests. For certain individuals, he noted that breathing in allergy-causing materials or 
“triggers” can lead to onset of asthma.239
The injuries and attendant negative health effects that PHR documented are most probably 
not the result of exposure to toxic gas from having participated in protests or from hav-
ing been a bystander to those assemblies where toxic chemical agents were used. Rather, 
229. Interview with key informant no. 11, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012). 
230. Id.
231. Interview with key informant no. 85, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
232. Muhammad’s doctor reported that he was cyanotic and gasping and ultimately suffered a cardiac arrest. 
Interview with key informant no. 84, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012). 
233. Id.
234. Id. 
235. Asthma is a disorder in which airways in the lungs become inflamed. PubMed Health, Asthma, 1 May 2011, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001196/. Scientists do not know precisely what causes asthma, 
but sustained exposure to certain materials may trigger asthma symptoms in adults. Asthma and Allergy 
Foundation of America, Adult Onset of Asthma, http://www.aafa.org/display.cfm?id=8&sub=17&cont=157 (last 
visited 30 Jun. 2012). 
236. Interview with key informant no. 20, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012). 
237. Interview with key informant no. 26, in Bahrain (9 Apr. 2012).
238. Interview with key informant no. 11, in Bahrain (8 Apr. 2012). 
239. Id. 
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31these cases illustrate the serious long-term harm that results from Bahraini law enforce-
ment officials’ persistent targeting of civilians with toxic chemical agents in enclosed spaces. 
Miscarriages, severe respiratory distress resulting in premature death, an apparent rise in 
asthma rates, and genetic mutations causing deformities represent some of the possible 
health consequences that PHR predicts will become more prevalent in Bahrain as a direct 
result of police violence. These actions contravene international human rights law, which the 
Kingdom of Bahrain must uphold. 
Legal analysis of Bahrain’s human rights violations
Based on extensive interviews and medical evaluations of wounded civilians and review of 
their medical records, Physicians for Human Rights finds that Bahraini law enforcement of-
ficials failed to respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights 
of all citizens.240 Specifically, Bahraini law enforcement officials (1) subjected men, women, 
and children, including vulnerable disabled and elderly persons, to torture or cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment; (2) unlawfully entered families’ homes and destroyed property; (3) 
intentionally committed acts that impair people’s health; and (4) discriminated against one re-
ligious sect by targeting Shi’a homes and neighborhoods. 
Torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The Bahraini government’s willful and 
unrelenting attacks against Shi’a neighborhoods and homes with toxic chemical agents con-
stitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as defined in international law. The 
Convention Against Torture, to which Bahrain is a party, defines torture as “any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for... 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official”. 241 The weaponized 
toxic chemical agent attacks against Bahraini civilians cause severe pain and suffering among 
affected populations, including severe respiratory distress resulting in premature death as 
well as possible connections to miscarriages or genetic mutations. The attacks are intention-
al—and may be official policy—because of the frequency of the attacks by officials throughout 
the police force and the lack of accountability for those who perpetrate the attacks. Based 
on interviews with those subjected to toxic chemical agent attacks, the attacks are meant to 
intimidate the victims and are based on ethnic discrimination against the Shi’a community. 
Lastly, the attacks documented were indeed perpetrated by law enforcement officials and not 
independent civilians. The attacks violate Bahrain’s obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture as well as the Bahraini Constitution, which outlaws physical or mental torture.242 
The weaponized toxic chemical agent attacks may also constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment (CIDT). While definitions of CIDT are debated by international legal experts, one 
accepted definition of CIDT is an act that entails severe physical or mental pain or suffering.243 
240. “In the performance of their duty, law enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity and 
maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons.” U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 
supra note 1, at art. 2.
241. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, 10 Dec. 
1984, 1465. U.N.T.S. 85 (acceded 6 Mar. 1998) (hereinafter CAT). See also the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights which states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” ICCPR supra note 175, at art. 7. 
242. “No person shall be subjected to physical or mental torture, enticement or degrading treatment, and the law 
shall provide the penalty for these acts. Any statement or confession shall be null and void if it is proved to 
have been made under duress or enticement or degrading treatment or threat thereof.” Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, supra note 13, at art. 19(d).
243. Elements of Crimes for the ICC, Definition of torture as a war crime (ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(ii) and (c)(i)). 
The definition relates to the International Criminal Court, but other courts have referred to this language 
when analyzing incidents of CIDT. 
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32 Manfred Nowak, former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, explains that the application of 
CIDT is a relative concept and that outside a situation of detention, the prohibition of CIDT is 
subject to the proportionality principle.244 Excessive use of police force, for example, would 
constitute CIDT. The conduct and the powerlessness of the victim is part of Nowak’s examina-
tion of proportionality. The Bahraini law enforcement officials’ toxic chemical agent attacks 
on civilians in their homes violate the principle of proportionality; the harm of the attack is 
grossly imbalanced given the lack of security threat posed by many of the victims. 
Case law supports the argument that weaponized misuse of toxic chemical agents may be 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The European Court of Human Rights found that 
unwarranted spraying of pepper spray in an individual’s face subjected the victim to intense 
physical and mental suffering, given the health effects of the toxic chemical agent. The court 
concluded that the spraying amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.245
Unlawful interference with privacy, family, home. Every person has the right to be protected 
against arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, home, or family, according to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Bahrain is a party.246 Bahrain’s 
Constitution also ensures the inviolability of one’s residence, which cannot be entered or 
searched without permission of the occupant.247 Bahrain’s penal code similarly prohibits any-
one from unlawfully entering another person’s home,248 damaging someone’s property,249 or 
endangering another’s property by attempting to use explosives.250 Therefore, when Bahraini 
law enforcement officials intentionally target and shell homes with canisters containing toxic 
chemical agents, break into people’s residences, and destroy their property, as PHR docu-
ments in this report, the Government of Bahrain is in flagrant violation of its national and in-
ternational obligations. 
Impairing health. State obligations regarding the promotion of and respect for people’s right to 
health are minimal under international law, as states only pledge to progressively realize this 
right. When a government deliberately and knowingly impairs the health and well-being of its 
population by weaponizing toxic chemical agents and attacking their homes, however, it immedi-
ately erodes this fundamental right and inflicts long-term damage on people’s health. Bahraini 
law enforcement officials who brazenly fire toxic chemical agent shells into civilian homes 
244. Manfred Nowak & Elizabeth McArthur, The Distinction Between Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, 16 Torture 147, 149 (2006).
245. Ali Günes v. Turkey (dec.), no. 9829/07, ECHR, (2012) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
110262.
246. “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence... Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
ICCPR supra note 175, at art. 17. 
247. “Places of residence shall be inviolable. They may not be entered or searched without the permission of their 
occupants except in the circumstances and manner specified by the law.” Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Bahrain, supra note 13, at art. 25. 
248. “A prison sentence for a period of no more than six months or a fine of no more than BD 50 shall be the 
penalty for any person who enters an inhabited place, [or] a place intended for dwelling…. The penalty shall be 
imprisonment for no more than two years if the crime is committed at night or with the use of violence against 
persons or property or with the use of a weapon….” Bahrain Penal Code, supra note 187, at art. 361. 
249. “A punishment of imprisonment or a fine, or either penalty, shall be inflicted upon every civil servant or 
officer entrusted with public service who has, as a result of his own failure, caused serious damage to some 
properties for which he is responsible for safekeeping as part of the duties of his office.” Id., at art. 200. 
250. “A punishment of imprisonment for a period of not exceeding ten years shall be inflicted upon any person who 
willfully uses or attempts to use explosives in a manner that is likely to expose others’ property to danger.” Id., 
at art. 281.
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33flout the Bahraini Constitution, which grants the right to health to Bahraini citizens,
251 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, to which Bahrain is a party.252
In addition, Bahrain’s penal code metes out severe punishment to anyone who endangers 
public health:
“Life or term imprisonment shall be the penalty for any person who exposes human lives or safety of 
the public to danger by placing materials, germs or other things in a water well or tank or anything 
that is intended for public use, that may cause death or serious damages [sic] to public health.”253
Discrimination. A government discriminates against a group of people when it singles out the 
group because of the race, religion, origin, language, or other status of the group’s mem-
bers, and based on that status denies them any of the rights and freedoms to which they are 
entitled.254 Based on analysis of the patterns and frequency of toxic chemical agent attacks 
against homes and neighborhoods in Bahrain, Physicians for Human Rights concludes that 
the Government of Bahrain intentionally targets the Shi’a Muslim community,255 contravening 
the Bahraini Constitution256 and Bahrain’s international legal obligations.257 Preliminary analy-
sis of data suggests that among approximately 65 Shi’a residential areas—roughly 80% of all 
neighborhoods in Bahrain—the majority of Shi’a neighborhoods have been exposed to toxic 
chemical agent attacks at least once per week since February 2011. Sunni-dominated neigh-
borhoods have largely remained free from toxic chemical agent attacks.
251. “Every citizen shall have the right to health welfare. The State shall care for public health and ensure means 
of prevention and treatment….” Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, supra note 13, at art. 8. 
252. “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.” International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, art. 12(1), 16 Dec. 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (acceded 27 Sep. 2001) (hereinafter ICESCR).
253. Bahrain Penal Code, supra note 187, at art. 283.
254. “[T]he Committee believes that the term “discrimination” … should be understood to imply any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground … and which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights 
and freedoms.” UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination, ¶ 7, 10 
Nov. 1989, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883fa8.html. 
255. Protests in Bahrain occur exclusively in Shi’a or mixed neighborhoods.
256. “People are equal in human dignity, and citizens shall be equal in public rights and duties before the law, 
without discrimination as to race, origin, language, religion or belief.” Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
supra note 13, at art. 18.
257. “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, supra note 175, at art. 2(1). 
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To the Government of Bahrain:
• End all attacks on civilians, including tear gas attacks on civilians and homes.
• Given the harmful effects of tear gas misuse in the country, suspend all use of tear gas 
until such time as the Government of Bahrain conducts a full and impartial investigation 
of the events detailed in this report, retrains the national security forces in the proper use 
of tear gas, and holds the perpetrators of excessive or improper use of force accountable. 
After such initial benchmarks are met, adhere to United Nations guidelines on the use of 
force and to the Bahraini penal code in order to stem future misuse of tear gas. 
• Establish an independent body consisting of individuals familiar with human rights and 
legal norms regarding the use of force to investigate the deliberate misuse of toxic 
chemical agents in Bahrain. 
• Disclose information about the varieties of toxic chemical agents used by law 
enforcement officials in Bahrain, given the disturbing evidence of the harmful effects 
of toxic chemical agents from PHR’s investigation as well as the BICI report. This 
information will be important to the current treatment of exposed Bahraini citizens, and 
to drive future scientific research on the effects of all toxic chemical agents.  
• Allow scientists, health professionals, and epidemiologists to conduct critical 
toxicological and survey research on the use and effects of tear gas in Bahrain.
To the international community:
• Suspend global exports of tear gas and its relevant precursor chemical agents to 
Bahrain until such time as the Government of Bahrain conducts a full and impartial 
investigation of the events detailed in this report, retrains the national security forces in 
the proper use of tear gas, and holds the perpetrators of excessive or improper use of 
force accountable. 
• Convene an interdisciplinary group of health professionals, lawyers, law enforcement 
officials, and public health experts to draft guiding principles on the proper use of 
all toxic chemical agents, especially those classified as lachrymatory agents, and 
to determine whether the application and toxicity of certain lachrymatory agents 
necessitate re-classification under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
• Support scientific research into the health effects of tear gas, including research on 
the possible connection to miscarriage and/or genetic disorders as well as long-term 
respiratory sequelae of excessive exposure.
• Review international, regional, national, and local guidelines on tear gas use and ensure 
that they follow the parameters of the UN Guidelines on the Use of Force, including 
mechanisms for accountability for misuse.
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35To the United States:
• Continue to deny export licenses for tear gas to Bahrain until the Government of Bahrain 
adheres to UN Guidelines on the Use of Force regarding its tear gas use, investigates the 
weaponization of tear gas, and establishes accountability for law enforcement officials 
who use excessive force or otherwise violate the UN Guidelines.
• Revoke tear gas licenses for other countries that show warning signs of improper use of 
tear gas or other riot control items against peaceful civilians.
• As a matter of policy, ensure that all tear gas and related materials are listed on the 
State Department’s US Munitions List, given the fatal consequences of the improper use 
of tear gas. 
• Provide stricter end-use monitoring of tear gas and related materials through the 
Department of Defense.
• Ensure that any military assistance to Bahrain comports with the Leahy Law and section 
502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
• Fully support international efforts to draft guiding principles on the proper use of all 
toxic chemical agents, and lead the international community in supporting scientific 
research on the health effects of these agents. 
A Bahraini woman displays an exploded canister of CS gas that was shot into her home. Photo: Richard Sollom, PHR
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Select list of countries that have recently deployed toxic chemical agents  
against civilians 
CHILE
Police routinely resorted to toxic chemical agents to disperse student protests across Chile 
from May to August 2011, as thousands of civilians assembled to demand educational and 
social reforms.258 Collectively, these protests became known as the “Chilean Winter,” named 
after the “Arab Spring.”259 Observers expressed concerns over excessive use of toxic chemi-
cal agents and police force in Chile,260 as violent clashes left hundreds of people injured and 
thousands of demonstrators arrested.261 The use of toxic chemical agents against youth in 
Chile is not unprecedented, but is reminiscent of crackdowns on student protests in 2006262 
and 2008.263
EGYPT
Egypt’s use of toxic chemical agents during the unfolding 2011 Egyptian Revolution drew inter-
national attention, as media reported that government law enforcement officials used British-
made264 and US-made265 toxic chemical agents to suppress pro-democracy demonstrations. 
Nationwide, occasionally violent protests leading up to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak as 
president in February resulted in hundreds of deaths as riot police met civilians with toxic 
chemical agents and excessive force.266 Riot police continued to generate criticism for repeat-
edly using toxic chemical agents against demonstrators,267 most notably during protests in 
June 2011268 and renewed clashes in Tahrir Square in November 2011.269 Some physicians also 
argued that Egyptian law enforcement officials used a more powerful variation of toxic chemi-
cal lachrymatory agents that led to seizures and convulsions for those exposed.270
258. Gideon Long, Chile student protests point to deep discontent, BBC, 11 Aug. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
latin-america-14487555.
259. Alexei Barrionuevo, With Kiss-Ins and Dances, Young Chileans Push for Reform, New York Times, 4 Aug. 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/world/americas/05chile.html.
260. Amnesty International cited by Gideon Long, Chile’s Patagonia region sees mounting unrest, BBC, 6 Mar. 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17256697; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Chile 1 
(2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/chile_2012.pdf.
261. The fraught politics of the classroom, Economist, 29 Oct. 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21534785.
262. Human Rights Watch, Chile: Dismissal of Riot Police Chief Welcomed, 2 Jun. 2006, http://www.hrw.org/
news/2006/06/01/chile-dismissal-riot-police-chief-welcomed; Jonathan Franklin, Protests paralyse Chile’s education 
system: Student-led strike is largest in country’s history: First major test for Bachelet’s government, Guardian, 7 Jun. 
2006, at International Pages 14. 
263. Rodrigo Martinez, Rocks and tear gas in Chile’s annual youth protests, Reuters, 29 Mar. 2008, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2008/03/29/us-chile-protest-idUSN2843349620080329; Movilización estudiantil suma más de 300 
detenidos [Student mobilization numbers more than 300 detainees], Radio Cooperativa, 28 May 2008, http://
www.cooperativa.cl/movilizacion-estudiantil-suma-mas-de-300-detenidos/prontus_nots/2008-05-28/104948.html.
264. Sarah Morrison and Bel Trew, British-made tear gas was used on Egypt’s protesters, The Independent, 4 Dec. 
2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/britishmade-tear-gas-was-used-on-egypts-protesters-
6272117.html.
265. Jack Shenker and Luke Harding, US firm’s teargas used against Tahrir Square protesters, The Guardian, 21 Nov. 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/21/tahrir-square-us-teargas-used-egypt.
266. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Egypt 3 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/
egypt_2012.pdf.
267. Amnesty International, Egypt’s military rulers must protect protesters as they promised and end military trials of 
civilians, Jan. 2012, http://www.amnesty.org/zh-hant/node/28299.
268. Patrick Werr and Yasmine Saleh, Egypt police clash with youths; over 1,000 hurt, Reuters, 29 Jun. 2011, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/us-egypt-protest-idUSTRE75R7ZM20110629.
269. David Kirkpatrick, Egypt’s Cabinet Offers to Resign as Protests Rage, New York Times, 21 Nov. 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/11/22/world/middleeast/facing-calls-to-give-up-power-egypts-military-battles-crowds.html.
270. Peter Beaumont and John Domokos, Egyptian military using ‘more dangerous’ teargas on Tahrir Square protesters, 
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37GREECE
Police officials’ use of toxic chemical agents to disperse demonstrations sparked by the Greek 
debt crisis received national and international criticism.271 Government crackdown on protests 
peaked in the summer of 2011, when several months of rallies drew tens of thousands of civil-
ians who were unhappy about austerity cuts.272 In February 2012, police used toxic chemical 
agents against thousands of protesters,273 despite an ongoing investigation by the Athens 
prosecutor into excessive use of police force.274 In 2008, Greek law enforcement officials used 
at least 4,600 tear gas capsules to quell demonstrations and riots in Athens.275
HONDURAS
In February 2012, a devastating prison fire that killed at least 350 prisoners drew crowds of 
inmates’ relatives eager to enter the complex and reach their family members or access their 
remains.276 Police dispersed these relatives with toxic chemical agents,277 renewing concerns 
that national police in Honduras have a history of firing toxic chemical agents against civilians 
indiscriminately.278 Several cases of police abuse of toxic chemical agents were reported in 
2010,279 as well as during the demonstrations and constitutional crisis that followed the coup 
d’état of June 2009.280
ISRAEL
International observers have expressed concerns over recent abuse of toxic chemical agents 
against demonstrators281 amid tension over Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In June 
The Guardian, 23 Nov. 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/23/egyptian-military-teargas-tahrir-square.
271. Άνοιξε ο ασκός του Αιόλου στη Βουλή εξαιτίας των επεισοδίων [He initiated the discussion in the 
House because of the incidents], Skai, 30 Jun. 2011, http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/173639/anoixe-o-
askos-tou-aiolou-sti-vouli-exaitias-ton-epeisodion; Amnesty International, Amnesty International Urges Greece 
Not to Use Excessive Force During Protests, 16 Jun. 2011, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/
amnesty-international-urges-greece-not-to-use-excessive-force-during-protests; Eva Cosse, Greek Protests Test 
Government’s Commitment to Rights, Human Rights Watch, 14 Jul. 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/14/
greek-protests-test-government-s-commitment-rights-0.
272. Niki Kitsantonis and Suzanne Daley, Greeks Stage Protests Against Spending Cuts and Tax Increases, New York 
Times, 12 May 2011, at A4; Kerin Hope, Rift widens over Greek reform plan, Financial Times, 7 Jun. 2011, at World 
News 3.
273. Greek crisis: thousands join protests as MPs debate bailout deal, Reuters, 12 Feb. 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/feb/12/greek-mps-bailout-deal; Amid clashes, Greek Parliament approves austerity measures, CNN, 13 
Feb. 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/12/world/europe/greece-debt-crisis/index.html.
274. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: European Union 6 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
related_material/eu_2012.pdf; Helena Smith, Greek police face investigation after protest violence, Guardian, 1 Jul. 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/01/greek-police-investigation-protest-violence.
275. Nick Squires, Greece ‘runs out of tear gas’ during violent protests, The Telegraph, 12 Dec. 2008, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/3725047/Greece-runs-out-of-tear-gas-during-violent-protests.html.
276. Morgue raided after Honduras prison fire, Al Jazeera, 21 Feb. 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012
/02/2012221173212428539.html. 
277. Honduras prison fire kills hundreds, BBC, 15 Feb. 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17038259. 
278. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Honduras 2 (2012) http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_
material/honduras_2012.pdf. See also Amnesty International, Honduras: human rights crisis threatens as repression 
increases 7 (2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR37/004/2009/en/0bef3d1b-ed50-46bc-8bb3-
3f8ca416016c/amr370042009eng.pdf.
279. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 2010 479 (2010), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2010eng/TOC.htm.
280. Police and military used toxic chemical agents routinely and excessively in 2009, resulting in several deaths 
and hundreds of injuries. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Honduras: Human Rights 
and the Coup D’État 22 (2009), http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/HONDURAS2009ENG.pdf.
281. Human Rights Watch, Israel: Investigate Killings During Border Protests, 20 May 2011, http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/05/20/israel-investigate-killings-during-border-protests; Bil Van Esveld, Israel’s Misguided Crackdown 
Strategy, Human Rights Watch, 23 Sep. 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/23/israels-misguided-crackdown-
strategy. See also Physicians for Human Rights, The Casualties of Conflict, supra note 64; Amnesty International, 
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38 2012, a UN Special Rapporteur called attention to the Israeli Defense Forces’ use of toxic 
chemical agent canisters as projectiles that cause severe injury and death.282 
LIBYA
In mid-February 2011, before Libyan unrest escalated into a full-fledged civil war, law en-
forcement officials killed and injured civilian protesters in Benghazi and elsewhere in the 
country using toxic chemical agents, batons, and live ammunition.283 International Criminal 
Court evidence suggested that authorities had planned to use toxic chemical agents and ex-
cessive force against civilians as soon as unrest began in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt in 
January 2011.284
MALAYSIA
The Malaysian government received international criticism for its use of toxic chemical agents 
in crackdowns on pro-democracy protests in April 2012.285 Tens of thousands of civilians as-
sembled peacefully on 28 April to call for election reform,286 in a demonstration organized by 
opposition leaders as a follow-up to the 2007287 and 2011288 Bersih rallies (similarly broken 
up by police). An interim report by the Malaysian Bar Council established that the use of toxic 
chemical agents was indiscriminate and excessive,289 while media accounts documented doz-
ens of injuries and hundreds of arrests.290
SOUTH KOREA
Authorities in South Korea in 1987 used hundreds of thousands of canisters containing toxic 
chemical agents over the course of two months (June and July) in the streets of Seoul to crush 
civilian uprisings.291 Civilians exposed to high quantities of toxic chemical agents suffered 
acute illnesses and severe health impairments; affected individuals went without medical 
The Misuse of Tear Gas by Israeli Army Personnel in the Israeli Occupied Territories June (2008), http://adalahny.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/images/image/June11988MisuseofteargasbyIDFpersonnelMDE15-26-88.pdf.
282. UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/17/Add.2, 11 Jun. 2012, http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/47d4e277b
48d9d3685256ddc00612265/68a8430f7c1ae73285257a1c00512d46?OpenDocument.
283. Clash breaks out as Libya braces for ‘day of anger’, Al Arabiya News, 16 Feb. 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/
articles/2011/02/16/137834.html; Anti-government protesters killed in Libyan clash, USA Today, 17 Feb. 2011, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-17-libya-protests_N.htm; Human Rights Watch, Libya: Arrests, Assaults 
in Advance of Planned Protests, 17 Feb. 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/16/libya-arrests-assaults-advance-
planned-protests; Amnesty International, The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances and Torture 7 (2011), http://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/16/libya-arrests-assaults-advance-planned-protests. 
284. ICC to probe Gaddafi over violence, Al Jazeera, 3 Mar. 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/03/201133
121511637608.html; Aaron Gray-Block, Exclusive: Gaddafi pre-planned attacks on civilians: prosecutor, Reuters, 5 
Apr. 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/05/us-libya-icc-exclusive-idUSTRE73443V20110405.
285. Human Rights Watch, Malaysia: Excessive Force Used to Disperse Peaceful Protests, 29 Apr. 2012, http://www.hrw.
org/news/2012/04/29/malaysia-excessive-force-used-disperse-peaceful-protests; Amnesty International, Malaysia: 
Police use brutal tactics against peaceful protesters, 11 Jul. 2011, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/
malaysia-police-use-brutal-tactics-against-peaceful-protesters-2011-07-11.
286. Ayse Alibeoglu, Police violence marks Malaysia reform rally, Al Jazeera, 28 Apr, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/asia-pacific/2012/04/20124286221449574.html. 
287. Robin Brant, Malaysia police break up protest, BBC, 10 Nov. 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7088877.stm.
288. Malaysia police detain hundreds at rally, Associated Press, 9 Jul. 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
jul/09/malaysia-opposition-protests-elections.
289. Bar Council Malaysia, Interim Report of the Malaysian Bar on BERSIH 3.0 rally held on 28 April 2012 29 (2012), 
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=3690&Itemid=332.
290. Lisa Ariffin, 388 arrested at Bersih rally, Malaysian Insider, 28 Apr. 2012, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/
malaysia/article/at-least-100-arrested-at-bersih-rally.
291. According to media sources, The Republic of Korea used 351,000 tear gas grenades and canisters in June 
1987 alone. Use of Tear Gas in the Republic of Korea, supra note 69, at 1. 
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39attention for fear of police and government harassment.
292 Physicians for Human Rights re-
ported following a July 1987 investigation that South Korea’s use of toxic chemical agents was 
indiscriminate, inhumane, and medically unacceptable because of lasting health repercus-
sions.293
TUNISIA
Tunisian law enforcement officials used toxic chemical agents against civilians throughout the 
2010-2011 protests that inspired the Arab Spring, killing hundreds and injuring thousands.294 
Protests continued despite the January 2011 resignations of President Ben Ali and Prime 
Minister Mohammed Gannouchi,295 during which time reports of improper use of toxic chemi-
cal agents increased.296 Law enforcement officials dropped a canister containing toxic chemi-
cal agents in a mosque in January 2011,297 and killed one foreign photographer after hitting 
him in the head with a toxic chemical agent canister at point blank range.298 
TURKEY
Turkish authorities have primarily targeted Kurdish minorities in the southeastern region of 
the country with toxic chemical agents in recent years because of ongoing protests against 
political restrictions.299 In March 2012, police used toxic chemical agents to violently dis-
perse traditional Navroz celebrations that drew thousands of demonstrators.300 Several large 
Kurdish protests also took place throughout 2011,301 over the course of which police employed  
toxic chemical agents and arrested thousands.302 The Turkish Parliament met in April 2011 to 
discuss police use of the riot control agent, but supported use of toxic chemical agents303 de-
spite ongoing criticism.304 
292. Id.
293. Id., at 4.
294. Report: 338 killed during Tunisia revolution, Associated Press, 5 May 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/
world/2012/05/05/report-338-killed-during-tunisia-revolution; Riots reported in Tunisian city, Al Jazeera, 20 Dec. 
2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122063745828931.html.
295. Tunisian PM Mohammed Ghannouchi resigns over protests, BBC, 28 Feb. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-12591445; Ben Ali quits after 23 yrs in power & leaves Tunisia, Al Arabiya, 14 Jan. 2011, http://www.alarabiya.
net/articles/2011/01/14/133432.html. 
296. Human Rights Watch, Tunisia: Hold Police Accountable for Shootings, 29 Jan. 2011, http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/01/29/tunisia-hold-police-accountable-shootings; Human Rights Watch, A Dictatorship Defaults, 5 Feb. 
2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/05/dictatorship-defaults.
297. Violent clashes continue in Tunisia, Al Jazeera, 4 Jan. 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111410
1752467578.html.
298. Oliver Laurent, UNESCO, French government call for investigation of Lucas Dolega’s death, British Journal of 
Photography, 17 Feb. 2011, http://www.bjp-online.com/british-journal-of-photography/news/1937417/french-
photographer-dies-tunisia.
299. See Ivan Watson and Yesim Comert, Residents choke on tear gas as tensions rise in Turkey, CNN, 13 Dec. 
2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-12-13/world/turkey.kurds_1_kurdish-kurdistan-workers-party-turkish-
parliament?_s=PM:WORLD; Minorities At Risk Project, Assessment for Kurds in Turkey, University of Maryland 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.
asp?groupId=64005 (last visited 21 Jun. 2012). 
300. Turkish police clash with Kurdish protesters, Al Jazeera, 18 Mar. 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2
012/03/2012318173842690891.html.
301. Turkey police disperse pro-Kurdish protesters, Al Jazeera, 27 Jun. 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2
011/06/2011626214739144330.html; Jonathan Burch, Turkish police fire tear gas in quake city, Al Jazeera, 10 Nov. 
2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/us-turkey-quake-idUSTRE7A875D20111110.
302. Dincer Gökce, Thousands detained in eastern Turkey since March, Hürryet Daily News, 16 May. 2011, http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=thousands-detained-in-the-east-since-march-2011-05-13. Id. 
Jonathan Burch, Turkish police fire tear gas in quake city, Al Jazeera, 10 Nov. 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/11/10/us-turkey-quake-idUSTRE7A875D20111110.
303. Göksel Bozkurt, Turkish Parliament approves police tear gas use with ‘health measures’, Hürryet Daily News, 
12 Apr. 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=parliament-tear-gas-report-raises-
eyebrows-2011-04-11.
304. Human Rights Watch, Letter to Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Erdogan, Regarding Human Rights Priorities for the New 
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Doubts about the fairness of the reelection process for President Museveni,305 now in his 26th 
year in office, inspired protests which escalated after the violent arrest of Uganda’s opposition 
leader in April 2011.306 For weeks, peaceful demonstrations in Kampala were met with exces-
sive police force including indiscriminate use of toxic chemical agents in houses and against 
non-protesters.307 The incidents resulted in hundreds of injuries and arrests, as well as re-
ported deaths.308 Despite apologies from Uganda’s Inspector General of Police, human rights 
organizations and donor nations condemned the crackdowns and called for further investiga-
tions.309
YEMEN
Inspired by the Arab Spring, the Yemeni Uprising in 2011 drew tens of thousands of protesters 
to the capital in antigovernmental demonstrations.310 Protests grew in size when major tribes 
joined the movement in February 2011,311 but were met on several occasions with excessive 
force by the police,312 resulting in hundreds of injuries and some deaths attributed to toxic 
chemical agents.313 Evidence suggested that the toxic chemical agents used by security offi-
cers not only had expired, but also contained chemicals much more powerful than those usu-
ally used for crowd control.314 
Government, 20 Jun. 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/20/letter-turkish-prime-minister-mr-erdo-regarding-
human-rights-priorities-new-governme; World Without Torture Blog, Tear gas: Is it a violation of human rights?, 31 
May 2012, http://worldwithouttorture.org/tag/turkey/. 
305. Josh Kron, President of Uganda Coasts Into a Fourth Term, New York Times, 20 Feb. 2011, http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/02/21/world/africa/21uganda.html.
306. David Smith, Ugandan opposition leader temporarily blinded in teargas raid, Guardian, 28 Apr. 2011, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/28/ugandan-police-teargas-arrest-opposition-leader.
307. Human Rights Watch, Uganda: “Walk to Work” Group Declared Illegal, 4 Apr. 2012, http://www.hrw.org/
news/2012/04/04/uganda-walk-work-group-declared-illegal. 
308. Uganda: Police tear gas ‘walk-to-work’ protesters, BBC, 14 Apr. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
13078400; David Smith, Uganda unrest gathers pace despite bloody government crackdown, Guardian, 29 Apr. 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/29/uganda-rebellion-crackdown-besigye-museveni; Uganda police fire tear 
gas at opposition, Al Jazeera, 12 May 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/05/201151217495146548.
html.
309. Amnesty International, Stifling Dissent: Restrictions on the Rights of Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly 
in Uganda 22 (2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/016/2011/en/0d582c10-b11a-4119-bcde-
13ec0d2718da/afr590162011en.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Uganda: Launch Independent Inquiry Into Killings, 8 
May 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/08/uganda-launch-independent-inquiry-killings; Ioannis Gatsiounis, 
Deadly Crackdown on Uganda’s Walk-to-Work Protests, Time, 23 Apr. 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2067136,00.html. 
310. Yemen protests: 20,000 call for President Saleh to go, BBC, 3 Feb. 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-12353479. 
311. Laura Kasinof and Neil MacFarquhar, Key Tribal Chief Wants Yemen Leader to Quit, New York Times, 27 Feb. 2011 
at A14; Major tribes join Yemen protests, PressTV, 26 Feb. 2011, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/167110.html.
312. Human Rights Watch, Days of Bloodshed in Aden, 9 Mar. 2011, http://www.hrw.org/node/97149/section/2.
313. Human Rights Watch, Yemen: Stop Shooting Protesters, 4 Apr. 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/04/yemen-
stop-shooting-protesters; Laura Kasinof, Yemen Security Forces Fire On Protesters in Capital, New York Times, 9 
Mar. 2011, at A8.
314. Laura Kasinof and Neil MacFarquhar, Police and Protesters Clash as Deal Is Sought to End Political Crisis, New 
York Times, 20 Apr. 2011 at A10; Cam McGrath, North Africa; Deadly Gas Enters the Arab Spring, Inter Press 
Service, 17 Dec. 2011, http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/12/deadly-gas-enters-the-arab-spring.
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41OTHER CASES of toxic chemical agent use against civilians in 2011/2012 include: Albania,
315 
Bolivia,316 Canada,317 Democratic Republic of Congo,318 Cote d’Ivoire,319 Georgia,320 Indonesia,321 
Kuwait,322 Malawi,323 Oman,324 Panama,325 Peru,326 Sudan,327 Swaziland,328 and Syria.329 
315. UK Border Agency, Albania Country of Origin Information (COI) Report, 55 (2012) available at http://www.ecoi.
net/file_upload/2016_1334656113_report-03-12.pdf.
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Timeline of relevant events in Bahrain (2011-2012)
14 February 2011 Bahraini protesters call for a “day of rage,” demanding political and 
economic reform. Law enforcement officials kill one person and 
injure dozens. 
17 February 2011 Hundreds of riot police attack protesters camped in Pearl Square 
with toxic chemical agents and rubber bullets. Law enforcement 
officials take over the square, killing five and injuring hundreds.
14 March 2011 The King of Bahrain calls on Arab Gulf states to send military 
support. Fifteen-hundred troops from Sunni Gulf states, two-thirds 
from Saudi Arabia, are deployed in Bahrain.
15 March 2011 The King declares a three-month state of emergency, giving the 
commander in chief of Bahrain’s military authority to disperse 
protests. 
16 March 2011 Bahraini law enforcement officials attack protesters at Pearl 
Square and occupy Salmaniya public hospital, preventing injured 
demonstrators from receiving medical treatment and arresting 
doctors and wounded protesters. 
9 April 2011 Bahraini law enforcement officials arrest Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, a 
prominent human rights activist, along with his two sons-in-law. 
22 April 2011  PHR releases its report Do No Harm: A Call for Bahrain to End 
Systematic Attacks on Doctors and Patients, detailing violations of 
medical neutrality in Bahrain.
1 June 2011 Government of Bahrain lifts its state of emergency. 
13 June 2011 Government of Bahrain puts 24 physicians and 24 nurses and 
paramedics on trial, accusing them of working with the opposition at 
Salmaniya hospital and hiding arms. 
22 June 2011 A hybrid military court sentences eight opposition activists, including 
Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, to life in prison for plotting to overthrow the 
Government. Thirteen additional activists each receive a sentence 
ranging from two to 15 years in jail. 
29 June 2011 King Hamad al-Khalifa establishes the Royal Independent 
Investigation Commission (later known as the Bahraini Independent 
Commission of Inquiry, or BICI) to investigate the events of February 
and March 2011.
8 July 2011 Political party Al-Wefaq pulls out of the parliament to protest the 
allotment of only 35 out of 300 seats to the Shi’a majority.
31 August 2011 Fourteen-year-old Ali Jawad Ahmad dies from the impact of a toxic 
chemical agent canister fired at his head by law enforcement officials 
in Sitra. Tens of thousands protest.
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using the Salmaniya Medical Complex for opposition activity; they 
receive sentences ranging from five to 15 years in jail.
5 October 2011 Bahrain’s attorney general orders a retrial of those medical 
professionals sentenced on 29 September. 
23 November 2011 BICI releases its report, which confirms the Bahraini government’s 
use of torture on detainees and the excessive use of force against 
civilians.
31 December 2011 New Year’s Eve protests in Sitra result in the death of 15-year-old 
Sayed Hashim Saeed, whom law enforcement officials struck with 
two canisters of toxic chemical agents. 
8 January 2012 PHR’s Richard Sollom is denied entry to Bahrain to observe the trial 
of the 20 medical professionals, despite possessing a valid five-year 
visa.
5 March 2012 Forty-five-day-old infant Yahya Yousif Ahmed dies reportedly due to 
complications from tear gas exposure, after law enforcement officials 
launch toxic chemical agents into her mother’s home eight times over 
the course of the pregnancy. 
20 March 2012 United Nations expresses concern over Bahrain’s misuse of toxic 
chemical agents and the death of civilians, after receiving reports of 
over 30 possible toxic chemical agent-related deaths.
22 April 2012 Formula 1 Grand Prix takes place in Manama, despite intense 
protests against the event. Police reportedly shoot and kill one 
protester.
30 April 2012 Bahrain’s Appeals Court orders a retrial in civilian court for 21 
opposition activists convicted by military court, including hunger 
striker Abdulhadi al-Khawaja. 
21 May 2012 UN Human Rights Council holds its second Universal Period Review 
for Bahrain. The Bahraini delegation denies allegations of many well-
documented human rights abuses. PHR releases its report Under the 
Gun: Ongoing Assaults on Bahrain’s Health System detailing impacts 
of Bahrain’s militarization and politicization of healthcare on the 
public health system.
14 June 2012 High Court of Appeals convicts 11 of the 20 medical professionals 
on trial for charges of illegal protesting and trying to overthrow the 
monarchy. The court acquits nine of the defendants. 
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UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials
Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990
Whereas the work of law enforcement officials* is a social service of great importance and 
there is, therefore, a need to maintain and, whenever necessary, to improve the working con-
ditions and status of these officials,
Whereas a threat to the life and safety of law enforcement officials must be seen as a threat to 
the stability of society as a whole,
Whereas law enforcement officials have a vital role in the protection of the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person, as guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
reaffirmed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Whereas the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners provide for the circum-
stances in which prison officials may use force in the course of their duties,
Whereas article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials provides that law en-
forcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for 
the performance of their duty,
Whereas the preparatory meeting for the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Varenna, Italy, agreed on elements to be 
considered in the course of further work on restraints on the use of force and firearms by law 
enforcement officials,
Whereas the Seventh Congress, in its resolution 14, inter alia, emphasizes that the use of 
force and firearms by law enforcement officials should be commensurate with due respect for 
human rights,
Whereas the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1986/10, section IX, of 21 May 
1986, invited Member States to pay particular attention in the implementation of the Code to 
the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, and the General Assembly, in its 
resolution 41/149 of 4 December 1986, inter alia, welcomed this recommendation made by the 
Council,
Whereas it is appropriate that, with due regard to their personal safety, consideration be given 
to the role of law enforcement officials in relation to the administration of justice, to the pro-
tection of the right to life, liberty and security of the person, to their responsibility to maintain 
public safety and social peace and to the importance of their qualifications, training and con-
duct,
The basic principles set forth below, which have been formulated to assist Member States in 
their task of ensuring and promoting the proper role of law enforcement officials, should be 
taken into account and respected by Governments within the framework of their national leg-
islation and practice, and be brought to the attention of law enforcement officials as well as 
other persons, such as judges, prosecutors, lawyers, members of the executive branch and 
the legislature, and the public.
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General provisions
(1) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall adopt and implement rules and 
regulations on the use of force and firearms against persons by law enforcement 
officials. In developing such rules and regulations, Governments and law enforcement 
agencies shall keep the ethical issues associated with the use of force and firearms 
constantly under review.
(2) Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as 
broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons 
and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms. These 
should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in 
appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application of means 
capable of causing death or injury to persons. For the same purpose, it should also be 
possible for law enforcement officials to be equipped with self-defensive equipment 
such as shields, helmets, bullet-proof vests and bullet-proof means of transportation, 
in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind.
(3) The development and deployment of non-lethal incapacitating weapons should be 
carefully evaluated in order to minimize the risk of endangering uninvolved persons, 
and the use of such weapons should be carefully controlled.
(4) Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply 
non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use 
force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of 
achieving the intended result.
(5) Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement 
officials shall:
(a) Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the 
offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved;
(b) Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life;
(c) Ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected 
persons at the earliest possible moment;
(d) Ensure that relatives or close friends of the injured or affected person are notified 
at the earliest possible moment.
(6) Where injury or death is caused by the use of force and firearms by law enforcement 
officials, they shall report the incident promptly to their superiors, in accordance with 
principle 22.
(7) Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law 
enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence under their law.
(8) Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public 
emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles.
Special provisions
(9) Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-
defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, 
to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to 
life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or 
to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to 
achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be 
made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.
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identify themselves as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, 
with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, unless to do so would unduly place 
the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to 
other persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances of 
the incident.
(11) Rules and regulations on the use of firearms by law enforcement officials should 
include guidelines that:
(a) Specify the circumstances under which law enforcement officials are authorized 
to carry firearms and prescribe the types of firearms and ammunition permitted;
(b) Ensure that firearms are used only in appropriate circumstances and in a manner 
likely to decrease the risk of unnecessary harm;
(c) Prohibit the use of those firearms and ammunition that cause unwarranted injury 
or present an unwarranted risk;
(d) Regulate the control, storage and issuing of firearms, including procedures for 
ensuring that law enforcement officials are accountable for the firearms and 
ammunition issued to them;
(e) Provide for warnings to be given, if appropriate, when firearms are to be 
discharged;
(f) Provide for a system of reporting whenever law enforcement officials use 
firearms in the performance of their duty.
Policing unlawful assemblies
(12) As everyone is allowed to participate in lawful and peaceful assemblies, in 
accordance with the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Governments and 
law enforcement agencies and officials shall recognize that force and firearms may be 
used only in accordance with principles 13 and 14.
(13) In the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent, law enforcement 
officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict 
such force to the minimum extent necessary.
(14) In the dispersal of violent assemblies, law enforcement officials may use firearms 
only when less dangerous means are not practicable and only to the minimum extent 
necessary. Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms in such cases, except 
under the conditions stipulated in principle 9.
Policing persons in custody or detention
(15) Law enforcement officials, in their relations with persons in custody or detention, 
shall not use force, except when strictly necessary for the maintenance of security 
and order within the institution, or when personal safety is threatened.
(16) Law enforcement officials, in their relations with persons in custody or detention, 
shall not use firearms, except in self-defence or in the defence of others against the 
immediate threat of death or serious injury, or when strictly necessary to prevent 
the escape of a person in custody or detention presenting the danger referred to in 
principle 9.
(17) The preceding principles are without prejudice to the rights, duties and 
responsibilities of prison officials, as set out in the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, particularly rules 33, 34 and 54.
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(18) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that all law enforcement 
officials are selected by proper screening procedures, have appropriate moral, 
psychological and physical qualities for the effective exercise of their functions and 
receive continuous and thorough professional training. Their continued fitness to 
perform these functions should be subject to periodic review.
(19) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that all law enforcement 
officials are provided with training and are tested in accordance with appropriate 
proficiency standards in the use of force. Those law enforcement officials who are 
required to carry firearms should be authorized to do so only upon completion of 
special training in their use.
(20) In the training of law enforcement officials, Governments and law enforcement 
agencies shall give special attention to issues of police ethics and human rights, 
especially in the investigative process, to alternatives to the use of force and firearms, 
including the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the understanding of crowd behaviour, 
and the methods of persuasion, negotiation and mediation, as well as to technical 
means, with a view to limiting the use of force and firearms. Law enforcement 
agencies should review their training programmes and operational procedures in the 
light of particular incidents.
(21) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall make stress counselling available 
to law enforcement officials who are involved in situations where force and firearms 
are used.
Reporting and review procedures
(22) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall establish effective reporting and 
review procedures for all incidents referred to in principles 6 and 11 ( f ). For incidents 
reported pursuant to these principles, Governments and law enforcement agencies 
shall ensure that an effective review process is available and that independent 
administrative or prosecutorial authorities are in a position to exercise jurisdiction 
in appropriate circumstances. In cases of death and serious injury or other grave 
consequences, a detailed report shall be sent promptly to the competent authorities 
responsible for administrative review and judicial control.
(23) Persons affected by the use of force and firearms or their legal representatives shall 
have access to an independent process, including a judicial process. In the event of 
the death of such persons, this provision shall apply to their dependents accordingly.
(24) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are 
held responsible if they know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials 
under their command are resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and 
firearms, and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress or 
report such use.
(25) Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that no criminal or 
disciplinary sanction is imposed on law enforcement officials who, in compliance with 
the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and these basic principles, refuse 
to carry out an order to use force and firearms, or who report such use by other 
officials.
(26) Obedience to superior orders shall be no defence if law enforcement officials knew 
that an order to use force and firearms resulting in the death or serious injury of a 
person was manifestly unlawful and had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow 
it. In any case, responsibility also rests on the superiors who gave the unlawful 
orders.
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Officials, the term “law enforcement officials” includes all officers of the law, whether ap-
pointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention. 
In countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or 
not, or by State security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded 
as including officers of such services.
Appendix D
UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979
Article 1
Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed upon them by law, by serv-
ing the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high 
degree of responsibility required by their profession.
Commentary:
(a) The term “law enforcement officials” includes all officers of the law, whether appointed or 
elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention.
(b) In countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether 
uniformed or not, or by State security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials 
shall be regarded as including officers of such services.
(c) Service to the community is intended to include particularly the rendition of services of 
assistance to those members of the community who by reason of personal, economic, 
social or other emergencies are in need of immediate aid.
(d) This provision is intended to cover not only all violent, predatory and harmful acts, but 
extends to the full range of prohibitions under penal statutes. It extends to conduct by 
persons not capable of incurring criminal liability.
Article 2
In the performance of their duty, law enforcement officials shall respect and protect human 
dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons.
Commentary:
(a) The human rights in question are identified and protected by national and international 
law. Among the relevant international instruments are the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on 
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid , the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
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identifying and protecting these rights.
Article 3
Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent re-
quired for the performance of their duty.
Commentary:
(a) This provision emphasizes that the use of force by law enforcement officials should be 
exceptional; while it implies that law enforcement officials may be authorized to use force 
as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances for the prevention of crime or in 
effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders, no force 
going beyond that may be used.
(b) National law ordinarily restricts the use of force by law enforcement officials in 
accordance with a principle of proportionality. It is to be understood that such national 
principles of proportionality are to be respected in the interpretation of this provision. 
In no case should this provision be interpreted to authorize the use of force which is 
disproportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved.
(c) The use of firearms is considered an extreme measure. Every effort should be made 
to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children. In general, firearms should 
not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise 
jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or 
apprehend the suspected offender. In every instance in which a firearm is discharged, a 
report should be made promptly to the competent authorities.
Article 4
Matters of a confidential nature in the possession of law enforcement officials shall be kept 
confidential, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require otherwise.
Commentary:
By the nature of their duties, law enforcement officials obtain information which may relate to 
private lives or be potentially harmful to the interests, and especially the reputation, of others. 
Great care should be exercised in safeguarding and using such information, which should be 
disclosed only in the performance of duty or to serve the needs of justice. Any disclosure of 
such information for other purposes is wholly improper.
Article 5
No law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law enforcement official invoke 
superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, a 
threat to national security, internal political instability or any other public emergency as a jus-
tification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Commentary:
(a) This prohibition derives from the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted by the General Assembly, according to which: 
“[Such an act is] an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the 
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fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [and 
other international human rights instruments].”
(b) The Declaration defines torture as follows: 
“... torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing 
him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him 
or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners.”
(c) The term “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” has not been defined 
by the General Assembly but should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible 
protection against abuses, whether physical or mental.
Article 6
Law enforcement officials shall ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their 
custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever 
required.
Commentary:
(a) “Medical attention”, which refers to services rendered by any medical personnel, 
including certified medical practitioners and paramedics, shall be secured when needed 
or requested.
(b) While the medical personnel are likely to be attached to the law enforcement operation, 
law enforcement officials must take into account the judgment of such personnel when 
they recommend providing the person in custody with appropriate treatment through, or 
in consultation with, medical personnel from outside the law enforcement operation.
(c) It is understood that law enforcement officials shall also secure medical attention for 
victims of violations of law or of accidents occurring in the course of violations of law.
Article 7
Law enforcement officials shall not commit any act of corruption. They shall also rigorously 
oppose and combat all such acts.
Commentary:
(a) Any act of corruption, in the same way as any other abuse of authority, is incompatible 
with the profession of law enforcement officials. The law must be enforced fully 
with respect to any law enforcement official who commits an act of corruption, as 
Governments cannot expect to enforce the law among their citizens if they cannot, or will 
not, enforce the law against their own agents and within their agencies.
(b) While the definition of corruption must be subject to national law, it should be understood 
to encompass the commission or omission of an act in the performance of or in 
connection with one’s duties, in response to gifts, promises or incentives demanded or 
accepted, or the wrongful receipt of these once the act has been committed or omitted.
(c) The expression “act of corruption” referred to above should be understood to encompass 
attempted corruption.
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Law enforcement officials shall respect the law and the present Code. They shall also, to the 
best of their capability, prevent and rigorously oppose any violations of them.
Law enforcement officials who have reason to believe that a violation of the present Code has 
occurred or is about to occur shall report the matter to their superior authorities and, where 
necessary, to other appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing or remedial power.
Commentary:
(a) This Code shall be observed whenever it has been incorporated into national legislation 
or practice. If legislation or practice contains stricter provisions than those of the present 
Code, those stricter provisions shall be observed.
(b) The article seeks to preserve the balance between the need for internal discipline of the 
agency on which public safety is largely dependent, on the one hand, and the need for 
dealing with violations of basic human rights, on the other. Law enforcement officials shall 
report violations within the chain of command and take other lawful action outside the 
chain of command only when no other remedies are available or effective. It is understood 
that law enforcement officials shall not suffer administrative or other penalties because 
they have reported that a violation of this Code has occurred or is about to occur.
(c) The term “appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing or remedial power” 
refers to any authority or organ existing under national law, whether internal to the law 
enforcement agency or independent thereof, with statutory, customary or other power to 
review grievances and complaints arising out of violations within the purview of this Code.
(d) In some countries, the mass media may be regarded as performing complaint review 
functions similar to those described in subparagraph ( c ) above. Law enforcement 
officials may, therefore, be justified if, as a last resort and in accordance with the laws 
and customs of their own countries and with the provisions of article 4 of the present 
Code, they bring violations to the attention of public opinion through the mass media.
(e) Law enforcement officials who comply with the provisions of this Code deserve 
the respect, the full support and the co-operation of the community and of the law 
enforcement agency in which they serve, as well as the law enforcement profession.
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Glossary
Biological weapon  “(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their ori-
gin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such 
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” 330
Chemical riot control agent  “Any chemical... which can produce rapidly in humans sensory ir-
ritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short 
time following termination of exposure.” 331
Chemical warfare agent “Chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which 
might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, 
animals and plants.” 332
Chemical weapon “(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types 
and quantities are consistent with such purposes;  
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or 
other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals 
specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result 
of the employment of such munitions and devices;  
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connec-
tion with the employment of munitions and devices specified in 
subparagraph (b).” 333
Chemical Weapons    International treaty aimed to prevent the stockpiling, retention and 
Convention   production of weapons of mass destruction. 334
Disproportionate “Not acting in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the 
legitimate objective to be achieved.” 335
Lachrymator  “Any substance which causes irritation and copious watering of the 
eyes when it comes into contact with them (in the form of a gas, 
spray, dust, or the like).” 336 
Law enforcement officials  “[A]ll officers of the law whether appointed or elected, who exercise 
police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention.” 337
Molotov cocktail   “A makeshift incendiary device for throwing by hand, consisting of a 
bottle or other breakable container filled with flammable liquid and 
with a piece of cloth, etc., as a fuse.” 338
330. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, (“Biological Weapons Convention”) art. 1, 26 Mar. 1975, available 
at http://www.opbw.org/convention/documents/btwctext.pdf. 
331. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 52, at art 2.7. 
332. Steven L. Hoeing, Handbook of Chemical Warfare and Terrorism, 24 ( 2002). 
333. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 52, at art. 2.1. 
334. Id., at art. 1. 
335. U.N. Principles on the Use of Force, supra note  108, at art. 5(a). 
336. Lachrymator, in Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 44. 
337. U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 1, at art. 1(a). 
338. Molotov, in Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed. 2002, online version 2012).
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60 Torture   “[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
.... punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him 
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.” 339
Toxic chemical  “Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes 
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to 
humans or animals.” 340
Use of force   “Amount of effort required by law enforcement to compel compli-
ance by an unwilling subject.” 341
339. Convention against Torture supra note 241, at art 1.1. 
340. Maciej J. Bogusz, Forensic Science, Volume 6, 406 (2002).
341. US Department of Justice, Review of the Department of Justice’s Use of Less-Lethal Weapons, supra note 107, at i. 
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